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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most frequent and important dilemmas people face in many aspects of their 
everyday life is the one between the present and future perspective. Focusing on the present is 
characterized mostly by the maximization of immediate benefits and disregard for future 
consequences, while a focus on the future entails forgoing immediate benefits and more long-
term planning. Individuals face many trade-offs that require deciding on whether to focus on 
present vs future consequences. Spending resources to acquire immediate advantages vs 
saving for the future and possibly more difficult times, or even also using energy on 
reproducing now or waiting to develop and reproduce are some examples with different 
ramifications. The way people resolve such dilemmas is very important as it can have 
important consequences not only for individual lives but also for society in general. For 
instance, recent findings showed that cues orienting people towards the present made them 
less moral (Yam, Reynolds & Hirsh, 2014) and trusting (Petersen & Aaroe, 2015), but also 
more collaborative (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006).  
This difference in time orientation has been found to be very important for decisions 
taking place in economic settings. For example, present vs future orientation can have an 
impact on the willingness to pay for certain products and the type of products consumers 
choose (Wertenbroch, 1998; Read, Loewenstein & Kalyanaraman, 1999; Kivetz & Simonson, 
2002), and in general on how individuals spend and invest their money (Hershfield et al., 
2011). Research has already investigated the impact of time orientation on a wide variety of 
(economic) behaviors. However, some important behaviors that studies have pointed out to 
potentially be influenced by time orientation remain under-researched so far. Budget waste 
from choice inconsistency linked to time orientation is one example. Understanding how 
choice inconsistency leads to waste of budget is important in order to help individuals make 
better decisions. A second very important (economic) behavior potentially influenced by time 
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orientation is people’s tendency to conform with social suggestions. Social norms have been 
used by numerous advertising campaigns as persuasion tools, and are fundamental in the 
economic fabric. Last, a third behavior that seems linked to time orientation is financial risk-
seeking. Most of the financial decisions people make on a daily basis include a (small or 
large) risk factor. In the present dissertation we investigate the impact of time orientation on 
these three behaviors through the lens of several dualistic concepts which include the 
difference between present and future orientation in their framework.   
 
Dual systems and time orientation 
Some of the most widely used dualistic distinctions in science include the difference 
between present and future orientation in their framework. Scholars have very often 
interpreted history, society, economics and politics through the use of ‘‘structural dyads’’ or 
‘‘bipolar opposites’’ (Bleiker, 2001). One of the first dualistic distinctions including the 
present vs future difference in its framework is the separation between human and animal 
mentality in philosophy. According to some philosophers, humans operate in two different 
modes, the animal mode which is capable only of associative and inductive reasoning and is 
characterized by satisfying more immediate needs on the one hand, and the human mode 
which is responsible of elaborated reasoning, deliberation and more long-term planning, on 
the other hand (Leibniz, 1989).  
The short vs long-term focus distinction can also be found in economics. According to 
Thaler & Shefrin (1981), a person consists of two inner selves, a planner and a doer, at any 
point in time. The planner is responsible for long term/lifetime utility maximization whereas 
the doer exists only in the current period and is more myopic. The planner is responsible for 
the decisions which maximize long-term utility, whereas the doer is responsible for behaviors 
that are characterized by more immediate gratification. Both of the aforementioned dualistic 
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distinctions were primarily meant to describe, explain and predict phenomena related to loss 
of self-control.  
One of the first behavioral scientists using a dualistic distinction including the 
difference between present and future focus was Freud. He argued that the human mind 
consists of two systems, a conscious and an unconscious one. Freud argued that these systems 
operate in different modes; the conscious mind operates in a logical mode and is responsible 
for the long-term planning while the unconscious mind operates in the associative mode and 
is responsible for satisfying more immediate urges. He also argued that the conscious mind 
does not have access to the content of the unconscious mind, and that the unconscious mind 
can be seen as a source of motivation and mental conflict (Freud, 1957). Since Freud, 
numerous behavioral studies have used some sort of dual system paradigm incorporating the 
difference between present and future focus to investigate and interpret psychological effects. 
Some of the most widely used behavioral theories are based on this dual system perspective: 
the dual-processing system, life-history strategies, behavioral inhibition and behavioral 
activation systems (BIS/BAS), self-control personality trait, and construal level theory, to 
name a few. All these systems have been found to have an impact on different aspects of 
individual’s behavior that extend beyond the distinction between the present and the future.  
In this dissertation we focus on three widely studied dual system distinctions, namely 
the dual-processing system, life-history strategies and mating tactics. All these systems 
include poles characterized by a certain time perspective. The one pole (intuitive judgments 
for dual-processing system, fast strategies for life-history strategies, and short-term tactics for 
mating tactics) is characterized by a focus on the presence while the other pole (cognitive 
judgments, slow strategies and long-term tactics, respectively) focuses on the future. We use 
these three dual systems to provide insights into some important and economically relevant 
behaviors: rational choice behavior, conformity and financial risk-taking. Literature suggests 
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that all these behaviors can be influenced by dualistic distinctions characterized by different 
time perspectives (see Thaler & Shefrin (1981) for rational choice behavior, Wheeler, Briñol 
& Hermann (2007) for conformity and Griskevicius et al. (2011) for financial risk-taking).  
 
Dual-processing system 
Some scholars consider the dual-processing system theory as one of the most important 
theoretical developments in the effort to understand human behavior (Dhar & Gorlin, 2013).  
The theory identifies two main reasoning processes, intuition and cognition (cf: Epstein, 
1994; Sloman, 1996). This dichotomy has been used by numerous studies under different 
labels to refer to it, including (but not constrained to) nonverbal versus verbal processes 
(Paivio, 1986), associative versus rule‐based system (Sloman, 1996), type I versus type II 
processes (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), hot versus cold system (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999), reflexive versus reflective system (Lieberman et al., 2002), and experiential 
versus rational system (Epstein, 1994, 2003). According to the dual-system theory, the human 
mind consists of an intuitive system, which is characterized by automatic, nonconscious and 
rapid reaction, and an evolutionarily newer cognitive system, which is characterized by 
slower, deliberate, conscious, and controlled reactions (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
Intuitive processing operates mainly through associative memory and is responsible for more 
rapid and unconscious judgments. On the other hand, cognitive processing is used more for 
hypothetical thinking and the engagement of working memory.  
The dual-processing reasoning framework has been widely applied to explain very 
diverse behavioral phenomena, such as judgments as diverse as probability estimates 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), moral judgments (Haidt, 2007), self-control failures 
(Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008), pro-social behavior (Pitesa, Thau & Pillutla, 2013), 
preference consistency (Lee et al., 2009; Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009) and choice biases 
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(Pocheptsova et al., 2009).  In general, dual-processing system has been proven to be a very 
useful theoretical development with numerous implications, and it is expected to be used in a 
significant number of future endeavors (Dhar & Gorlin, 2013). In the present dissertation we 
investigate the impact of dual-processing system on budget waste coming from choice 
inconsistencies.  
 
Life-history strategies 
Life-history theory was developed to explain how and why organisms allocate time, 
resources, and energy among the various tasks necessary for survival and reproduction 
(Charnov, 1993; Daan & Tinbergen, 1997; Low, 2000). According to the life history 
framework, the fact that energy and resources are inherently limited makes all organisms face 
important trade-offs in how they use their resources throughout the course of their life.  The 
amount of energy spent on body maintenance (e.g., immune system) cannot be spent on mate 
attraction (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Roff, 2002). Therefore, at a given point in time, all 
organisms must choose between allocating resources on one versus another fitness relevant 
life component. For example, a fundamental trade-off all organism face is whether and when 
to invest in somatic versus reproductive effort (Hill, 1993). The amount of energy invested in 
growth and maintenance of the body and mind cannot be spent on reproductive effort (e.g. 
acquiring a mate, birth and childcare).   
Life-history strategies vary along a fast-to-slow continuum according to the way in 
which individuals resolve the trade-off conflicts. In general, fast strategies are associated with 
earlier physiological and sexual development, a higher number of offspring, and reduced 
parental investment. Slow strategies are associated with later physiological and sexual 
development, a lower number of offspring, and greater parental investment (Ellis et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, research has found that the adoption of the different strategies has an impact on 
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a more behavioral level also. For instance, the adoption of fast strategies has been shown to 
lead to behaviors characterized by immediate gratification and risk-seeking, while the 
adoption of slow strategies was shown to lead to behaviors characterized by delay of 
gratification and less risk-seeking tendencies (Griskevicius et al., 2013).  
Adoption of the different strategies depends on environmental factors such as harshness 
(e.g., mortality and morbidity), unpredictability (e.g., the consistency of harshness from one 
period to another), and resource scarcity (Ellis et al., 2009). Harsh environments lead to fast 
strategies while less harsh and unpredictable environments lead to slow strategies. For 
example, organisms living in harsh and unpredictable environments tend to invest less in 
somatic effort and more in reproduction. The impact of the environment is an important 
element of life-history theory. As a result, life-history theory has become a very useful tool 
for studies investigating the impact of resource scarcity and socioeconomic background on 
people’s behavior (e.g. Griskevicius et al., 2011; Griskevicius et al., 2013). In essay 2, we use 
the concept of life-history strategies to investigate the effect of resource scarcity on 
conformity.  
 
Mating Tactics 
Mating tactics is an important topic of study in behavioral research as it focuses on a 
fundamental aspect of the life of humans, that is, mating alliances. All known human societies 
have formal mating alliances between men and women (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). The duration 
of a mating relationship is flexible; it can range from a few hours to several decades. 
Evolutionary theories on human mating argue that individuals have two main mating tactics: 
long- and short- term tactics (e.g. Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). This 
flexible mating design allows individuals to respond adaptively to a wide variety of 
circumstances. Males, generally, have benefited more than women from adopting short-term 
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mating tactics. A man mating with a significant number of women in a year would have more 
offspring than a woman doing the same. However, there is a considerable within-sex variation 
in preference for short- or long-term mating, as both men and women can be benefited by the 
different tactics (Schmitt, 2005).  
The most prevalent theory explaining the reasons why humans adopt different mating 
tactics is the theory of strategic pluralism (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). According to the 
theory, when local environments are harsh and demanding, the need for bi-parental care and 
long-term mating increases in order to better support infants’ demands. Those environments, 
characterized by resource scarcity, low life expectancy, low birth weight and high child 
malnutrition are associated with the prevalence of long-term mating tactics. However, in less 
harsh and demanding environments, humans tend to adopt a more short-term oriented mating 
tactic.  
Mating tactics have been found to have a highly significant impact on decisions directly 
associated with reproduction, for instance the choice of a partner. Individuals using short-term 
mating tactics tend to prefer more physically attractive partners, while individuals using more 
long-term mating tactics prefer more reliable partners (Simpson & Gangestad, 1992).  Recent 
findings show that mating tactics can also influence decisions of a more economic nature 
which are not directly linked to reproduction. Durante & Arsena (2014) found that women 
employing short-term mating tactics selected more unique options from consumer product 
sets than women using more long-term mating tactics. Sundie and colleagues (2011) showed 
that short-term mating tactics led men to consume more high status products as opposed to 
long-term tactics. In essay three we use the mating tactics theory to explain why some people 
take less financial risks than others.  
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Overall Goal of the Dissertation 
In this dissertation we investigate the behavioral outcomes of three important 
psychological dual systems which have as a common element the distinction between present 
and future orientation. In the first essay, we investigate the impact of the dual-processing 
system on budget waste coming from decision inconsistencies. We find that budget waste 
resulting from intuitive and cognitive judgments individually is comparable. However, after 
calculating overall budget waste across the two types of judgments we find a significant 
increase in budget waste. In the second essay, we investigate the impact of life-history 
strategies on conformity. We find that resource scarcity cues make people from a poor 
background (fast strategists) more conformist, while scarcity cues do not have an effect on 
people from a rich background (slow strategists). In the third essay, we test the effect of 
mating tactics on financial risk-taking. We find that salient mating goals drive people who 
adopt long-term tactics to become less risk-taking, while salient mating goals do not have an 
effect on people who adopt short-term strategies.  
 
Introduction to Essay 1 
A lot of research has linked economically irrational behavior to inconsistent choices 
triggered by the dual-processing system, often referred to as intuitive and cognitive judgments 
(Dhar & Gorlin, 2012). Previous research has investigated the role of both types of judgments 
in choice inconsistencies; however, some important questions remain unanswered: How 
severe are choice inconsistencies triggered by both types of judgment? Can such 
inconsistencies lead to a significant waste of money? We try to answer these questions by 
using the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) and Afriat Index to examine 
budget waste coming from the two types of judgments.  
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Literature findings are not clear. Several studies suggest that utility loss from 
suboptimal choices can stem from behavior triggered by intuitive judgments, as a lot of 
behaviors that can be viewed as suboptimal, such as lack of self-control and hyperbolic 
discounting, are attributed to intuition (Wertenbroch, 2003). On the other hand, a stream of 
research has shown that cognitive judgments can have a negative impact on decision quality, 
as cognition can act as a form of distraction which can pull attention away from the most 
relevant information, and as such lead to inconsistent behavior (Lee et al., 2009). Last, some 
studies suggest that waste of budget does not necessarily result from a specific system, but 
rather from a potential discrepancy between types of processing and/or decision situations 
(Read & Loewenstein, 1995).  
However, none of the above studies has used a direct measure of severity of inconsistent 
choices involving conditions with different price regimes and budget restrictions. We do 
precisely that by employing a measure capturing the severity of choice inconsistencies, and 
translate this into budget loss. In two experiments we conduct an investigation of the severity 
of inconsistent choices (coming from behaviors triggered by the two types of judgments) by 
using the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) and Afriat Index to examine 
choice behavior in terms of efficient budget use. 
In both of the studies we asked individuals to complete a task assessing budget waste 
coming from inconsistencies in two different sessions. In one session they relied more on 
intuition to complete the task, and in the other session they relied more on their cognition. We 
found that the budget waste in the session in which participants used their intuition was not 
significantly different from that in the session where they used their cognition. However, 
when we calculated the overall budget waste across both sessions, we found that this was 
significantly higher than the budget waste in the different sessions individually. We conclude 
that the discrepancy in choices resulting from intuitive versus cognitive judgments is 
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responsible for significant loss of decision utility in individuals’ economic decisions, rather 
than choice inconsistencies resulting from a specific type of evaluation in itself.  
 
Introduction to Essay 2 
The economic turmoil of the past years has increased the number of people 
experiencing financial insecurity (World Health Organization, 2014). Research has shown 
that resource scarcity can have a significant impact on different aspects of individuals’ 
behavior (e.g. Shah et at al., 2012). We focus on the responses to social influence. Social 
influence can have substantial impact on consumers' decision making (Wood & Hayes, 2012) 
as it is used as a tool for changing behaviors (e.g. Goldstein et al., 2009). Earlier findings 
suggest that financial constraints might enhance consumers’ sensitivity to social influence 
(e.g. Drèze & Nunes, 2011) but it is not clear how general this phenomenon is. Recent studies 
have suggested that individuals’ responses to resource scarcity can be adaptive. These studies 
used life-history theory to show that behavior of individuals facing adversities such as 
resource scarcity depends on their childhood socioeconomic background (Ellis, et. al., 2009). 
In essay 2, we use life-history theory to examine the impact of resource scarcity on 
conformity.  
In three studies we find that resource scarcity leads people who grew up poor to conform to 
social influence, while it does not have an effect on people who grew up rich. We speculate 
that these diverse effects of resource scarcity on conformity are due to the harsh conditions 
low SES people grew up in. Specially, harsh and unpredictable environments are 
characterized by increased dangers and mortality. This makes the acquisition of information 
through individual learning difficult and in many cases dangerous. When information is 
highly costly to be acquired with individual learning, individuals turn to social learning 
(conformity) to acquire information (Boyd & Richerson, 1998; Morgan et al., 2011). 
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Therefore, low SES individuals raised in harsh childhood environments are sensitized to 
acquire information through social learning. Resource scarcity cues makes them use the 
learning strategies learnt in their childhood and this makes them more conformist. On the 
other hand, people coming from high SES backgrounds are sensitized to use individual 
learning and rely on their own opinion as a result of the benign environments they lived in 
during their childhood. Therefore, resource scarcity cues make them use the learning 
strategies that they have been sensitized with during their childhood (individual learning), and 
thus they do not get influenced by the opinion of others.   
 
Introduction to Essay 3 
Each day, individuals make financial decisions large and small, many of which involve 
an element of risk. Although research has provided a psychologically more proximate account 
for variables influencing risky decision-making, many studies fall short of identifying the 
underlying social functions that risk-taking serves. Recent studies taking a more evolutionary 
perspective suggest that financial risk-taking is connected with individual differences that are 
tied to fundamental motives (e.g. self-protection and reproduction; Griskevicius & Kenrick, 
2013). In accordance with these recent findings, we find that differences in mating tactics can 
be an important variable influencing risk-taking.  
In two studies we find that the adoption of different mating strategies can lead to 
different levels of financial risk-taking. Evolutionary theories on human mating argue that 
individuals have two main mating strategies, long- and short- term strategies (e.g. Buss & 
Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). According to the literature, the different tactics 
can have a different impact on behaviors when mating goals are salient (Sundie et al., 2011). 
In line with this notion, our findings show that mating goal salience makes people who adopt 
long-term tactics to become less risk-taking, while mating goal salience does not have an 
12 
 
impact on people who adopt short-term strategies. We provide several explanations for this 
differential effect, and propose directions that future research could follow in order to shed 
more light on it.  
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ESSAY 1: A DUAL-PROCESS MODEL OF ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING: THE SYMMETRIC EFFECT OF 
INTUITIVE AND COGNITIVE JUDGMENTS ON OPTIMAL 
BUDGET ALLOCATION 
 
Abstract: Understanding the influence of dual-processing system on budget waste resulting 
from choice inconsistencies is critical in helping individuals maximize decision utility. In two 
studies we rely on the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) to explore the 
severity of choice inconsistencies resulting from intuitive and cognitive judgments separately, 
as well as overall severity across the two types of judgments. We find that budget waste 
resulting from intuitive and cognitive judgments is comparable, but that overall budget waste 
across the two types of judgments is significantly higher. These findings suggest that the 
discrepancy in choices resulting from intuitive versus cognitive judgments is responsible for 
significant loss of decision utility in individuals’ economic decisions, rather than choice 
inconsistencies resulting from a specific type of evaluation in itself. We discuss theoretical 
and practical implications of our findings.  
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Introduction 
Individuals often go grocery shopping to buy food to consume throughout the week. One 
of their basic goals is to choose products that maximize their utility given the available 
budget. However, very often people make inconsistent decisions, potentially resulting in 
inefficient budget use and a loss of utility (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Thaler, 2006). 
Understanding this process is essential in order to help individuals improve the quality of their 
decisions, and as a result to enhance their welfare (Ratner et al., 2008).  
A lot of research has linked inconsistent choices to behavior triggered by two different 
types of judgments, often referred to as intuitive and cognitive (Dhar & Gorlin, 2012). 
Intuitive judgments are relatively automatic, quick and effortless, whereas cognitive 
judgments are more deliberate, slow and effortful. Previous research has investigated the role 
of both types of judgments in choice inconsistencies. However, some important questions 
remain unanswered: How severe are choice inconsistencies triggered by both types of 
judgments? Can such inconsistencies lead to a significant waste of money? To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no study investigating whether inconsistent choices resulting from 
reliance on either intuitive or cognitive judgments lead to inefficient use of individuals’ 
budget and thus waste of money.  
Relying on the theory of revealed preferences and the Afriat Index, we develop a task that 
allows us to investigate severity of choice inconsistences created by the two types of 
judgments. We do this by capturing budget loss resulting from choice behaviors relying on 
either type of judgments. Apart from quantifying severity of choice inconsistencies, our task 
adds to existing studies investigating decision quality in relation to intuitive versus cognitive 
judgments in several ways. First, our approach is non-parametric, which means that it does 
not rely on non-verifiable assumptions regarding the functional structure of preferences. 
Second, it allows to test choice consistency in a non-binary paradigm and thus to account for 
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menu dependence effects (menu dependence effects arise when the choice can vary 
parametrically with which collection of alternatives is available for choice).  
We organize the article as follows. First, we review dual-process theories of decision 
making, and discuss key findings about how both intuitive and cognitive judgments can lead 
to inconsistent choices. Next, we introduce the theory of revealed preferences and the Afriat 
Index, and explain how those can assess choice inconsistency severity and quantify budget 
waste. We present two studies investigating budget waste triggered by the two types of 
judgments, and we conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications.  
 
Dual-Process Theory 
One of the important assumptions in behavioral science is that decision making is driven 
by two types of processes, intuition and cognition. Several studies have relied on this 
distinction between intuition and cognition, although different authors have been using 
different labels to refer to it, including (but not constrained to) nonverbal versus verbal 
processes (Paivio, 1986), associative versus rule‐based system (Sloman, 1996),  type I versus 
type II processes (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), hot versus cold system (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999), reflexive versus reflective system (Lieberman et al., 2002), and experiential 
versus rational system (Epstein, 1994, 2003). Intuitive judgments are quick and heuristic-
based, whereas cognitive judgments are deliberate and rule-based. The main features of 
intuition are its automatic operation and minimal demands on working memory. Intuition 
operates mostly through components of associative memory, meaning that different 
associations emerge spontaneously and influence behavior. It tends to be rapid, unconscious, 
and uncontrollable (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In contrast, the main features of cognition are 
the active engagement of working memory and analytical thinking. Cognitive processing 
happens willfully, and is effortful most of the time. It tends to be slow, conscious, and 
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controllable (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). It is important to note that this distinction between 
intuition and cognition is not definitive. That is, intuition and cognition do not act in isolation 
from each other: both are almost always active simultaneously. However, in some cases 
intuition puts more weight into the decisions, while in some other instances cognition is 
mainly responsible for the choices (Dhar & Gorlin, 2012). 
Neuroscience has added evidence for the existence of this intuitive versus cognitive 
distinction. Several studies have shown a relationship between automatic responses and 
activity in the limbic system (anterior cingulate and amygdala) on the one hand, and a 
relationship between more analytic and controlled processes and activity in the frontal regions 
of the brain such as the prefrontal and orbital cortex (LeDoux, 1996; McClure et al., 2004; 
Panksepp, 2004) on the other. Awareness that such differences in processing exist has 
triggered a growing interest in the role of these different types of processing in decision 
making. Several studies have investigated the influence of intuitive and cognitive processing 
on the quality of individuals’ decisions, which we discuss next. 
 
Dual Processing and Loss of Utility  
A stream of research has shown that cognitive judgments can have a negative impact on 
decision quality. This negative impact (in the form of suboptimal choices) can potentially lead 
to budget waste. According to this literature, cognition can hinder systematic processing in 
individuals’ decisions (Toresdillas & Chaiken, 1999). Specifically, cognition has been 
regarded a form of distraction which can pull attention away from the most relevant 
information, and as such lead to inconsistent behavior. For instance, Lee et al. (2009) showed 
in four studies that more cognitive processing can lead to more transitivity errors. In these 
studies, transitivity was defined as a well‐defined preference structure, such that for any set of 
bundles a, b, and c, if a ≥ b and b ≥ c, it must also be the case that a ≥ c. In another study, 
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Nordgren & Dijksterhuis (2009) showed that more deliberation led to a less consistent attitude 
towards products.  
Studies on (un)conscious thought and decision making also show that cognitive 
judgments can lead to less accurate decisions in some situations (Dijksterhuis, 2004; 
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). For instance, in Dijksterhuis’ (2004) study participants had to 
choose their favorite product (e.g. apartment or car) from a hypothetical set of options; some 
of the options had more positive attributes than other options. Participants who deliberated 
more chose significantly fewer options with positive attributes than participants who made a 
more intuitive choice. According to the authors, conscious thinking led to less polarized, 
clear, and integrated representations in memory and prevented meaningful clustering.  
Combined, although these studies do not provide measures on the severity of inconsistencies 
nor potential waste of budget, they provide a good indication that cognitive judgments can 
contribute to loss of utility.   
On the other hand, several studies suggest that utility loss from suboptimal choices can 
stem from intuitive judgments. A lot of behaviors that can be viewed as suboptimal, such as 
lack of self-control and hyperbolic discounting, are attributed to intuition (Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1998; Wertenbroch, 2003). According to the traditional economic point of view 
(Thaler & Shefrin, 1981), a person consists of two inner selves, a planner (cognition) and a 
doer (intuition), at any point in time. The planner is responsible for utility maximization 
whereas the doer, who exists only in the current period, is selfish and myopic. The planner is 
responsible for the more virtuous decisions which maximize long-term utility, whereas the 
doer often succumbs to indulgence and is responsible for impulsive behaviors and loss of 
long-term utility. In line with this view, O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999) showed that typical 
decisions based on intuition such as immediate gratification can cause welfare loss which may 
be severe on several occasions. In an experimental study, Van den Bergh, Dewitte & Warlop 
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(2008) found that “hot” stimuli inducing intuitive processing led individuals to become more 
impulsive in the pursuit of monetary rewards. Furthermore, Shiv et al. (2005) showed that 
participants able to use their emotions made less advantageous investment decisions and thus 
gained less money than participants not able to use their emotions (due to brain damage) and 
thus relying on cognition only for making decisions. Studies on resource depletion showed 
that depleted consumers, who are considered to rely on intuition, were willing to pay 
significantly higher amounts of money for the same products than consumers who were not 
previously depleted (e.g. Bruyneel et al., 2006).  Taken together, this set of studies suggests 
that intuitive judgments can contribute to loss of utility. None of these studies provides 
insights in the severity of this utility loss or the potential budget waste related to it, however.   
Adopting yet another perspective, some studies suggest that loss of utility (and/or budget 
waste) does not necessarily result from a specific type of judgment (i.e., from either intuitive 
or cognitive processing), but rather from a potential discrepancy between types of processing 
and/or decision situations. For instance, Read & Loewenstein (1995) found that when people 
choose multiple goods simultaneously (for instance during grocery shopping), they choose 
more variety of products than when they choose these goods sequentially (i.e., known as the 
“diversification bias”). According to the authors, this discrepancy in desired variety can 
potentially lead to inconsistent choices and loss of utility over time. Investigating the 
diversification bias further, Read et al. (1999) concluded that what appears to be desirable 
locally might not be likeable when adopting a more global perspective.  
Furthermore, some other studies suggest that loss of utility caused by choice discrepancy 
might result from discrepant forecasting between different types of judgments (Kahneman & 
Snell, 2002; Kahneman & Thaler, 2006; Fisher & Rangel, 2014). For instance, Read and van 
Leeuwen (1996) showed that when people were hungry, they tended to choose more 
unhealthy food products compared to when they were satiated. In a similar vein, Fisher and 
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Rangel (2014) found that when hungry, individuals tend to evaluate all food items higher than 
when satiated. In general, when individuals use one type of judgment (for example their 
cognition), they are not able to correctly predict their own preferences resulting from the other 
type of judgement (for example their intuition). Fisher & Rangel (2014) also observed these 
mispredictions to be symmetric (i.e., they occurred from intuitive to cognitive and from 
cognitive to intuitive). To the best of our knowledge however, none of these studies has 
investigated whether these mispredictions can lead to inconsistent choices severe enough to 
end up in a loss of budget. Evaluating food differently or choosing different food items does 
not necessarily lead to waste of money (see method section and discussion for more detailed 
examples).  
To summarize, findings on the influence of cognitive and intuitive judgments on utility 
loss are equivocal. There are studies implying that utility loss is driven by cognitive 
judgments, but there are also studies hinting at the idea that intuitive judgments lead to loss of 
utility. Yet other studies adopt a more neutral position, and suggest that a discrepancy 
between decision situations (and decision processes) may trigger inconsistent decisions, and 
thus result in an overall loss of utility. However, none of the studies has used a direct measure 
of severity of inconsistent choices involving conditions with different price regimes and 
budget restrictions. We do precisely that by employing a measure capturing the severity of 
choice inconsistencies, and translate this into budget loss. We believe that an investigation 
that does this could be very helpful in shedding light on the drivers of loss of utility. We will 
conduct such an investigation, and use the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences 
(GARP) and the Afriat Index to examine choice behavior in terms of efficient budget use. We 
introduce GARP and the Afriat Index next. 
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Revealed Preferences and the Ariat Index Efficiency 
According to the traditional view in economics, preference consistency is a prerequisite 
for utility maximizing behavior (Choi et al., 2007). However, not all inconsistent choices have 
an equally significant negative impact on how efficiently people use their budgets (Harbaugh 
et al., 2001; Echenique, Lee, & Shum, 2011). In order to estimate utility loss triggered by 
inconsistent choices one could calculate how severe observed choice inconsistencies are. 
Revealed preference theory and the Afriat Index allow us to do this, as they translate choice 
consistency violations into an estimation of waste of budget.  
Revealed preference theory was initiated by Samuelson (1938), according to whom a 
chosen bundle of goods xi is “directly revealed preferred” over some other bundle xt, if xi is 
chosen when xt is also in the budget set (i.e. xt is not more expensive than xi at the prevailing 
prices pi). If the individual (as a utility maximizer) always chooses the best bundle s/he can 
get, then, if xi is revealed preferred to xt, s/he must never choose xt when xi is available. This 
requirement is called the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). 
Varian (1982) formulated the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP), 
which makes use of indirect revealed preferences. A chosen bundle of goods xi is “indirectly 
revealed preferred” over some other bundle xt, if and only if  there exists a sequence of 
bundles xj, xk ,… , xs such that xi is directly preferred over xj, xj is directly preferred over xk, 
… , and xs is directly preferred over xt.. According to GARP, if a bundle xi is indirectly 
revealed preferred to xt, then xt is not strictly directly revealed preferred to xi, that is, xi is not 
strictly within the budget set when xt is chosen. Varian proved that GARP provides a 
necessary and sufficient condition for decision-makers’ choices to be consistent with the 
maximization of a concave, positive monotonic, locally non-satiated and continuous utility 
function.  
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Figure 1 exhibits a GARP violation, which consists of a choice inconsistency that ends up 
in waste of budget. Suppose an individual wants to dedicate a budget of 120$ between 2 
products X and Y. When the prices are p1 (a price of 12 for X and a price of 8 for Y) the 
individual can buy all combinations below the budget line b1. Suppose the individual chooses 
to buy the combination A (X=8, Y=3). When the prices change to p2 (a price of 8 for X and a 
price of 12 for Y) all possible combinations that lie in the area below the budget line b2 can be 
bought. Should the individual choose to buy the combination B(X=3, Y=8), this would violate 
GARP as bundle A is revealed preferred to bundle B, and bundle B is strictly revealed 
preferred to bundle A. By choosing combination B the individual actually wastes money as, 
for the given prices p2, the revealed preferred bundle A was available at a lower cost (equal to 
8*8+3*12=100$) than the chosen bundle B (in which case s/he pays 3*8+8*12=120$). In our 
example the individual thus failed to maximize the utility of the given budget as s/he chose 
bundle A over B at prices p1 when B was cheaper (8*12+3*8=120$ for A and 
8*8+3*12=100$ for B), while s/he also chose bundle B over A at prices p2 when bundle A 
was cheaper (8*8+3*12=100$ for A and 8*12+3*8=120$ for B). In each situation s/he spent 
120$ (240$ in total). If s/he had chosen B over A at prices p1 and A over B at prices p2 s/he 
would have spent 100$ in each situation (200$ in total) and ended up with the same quantities 
of products. This difference of 40$ constitutes waste of budget.  Below we will introduce the 
Afriat Index as a measure for the efficiency of individuals’ choices, which captures exactly 
this idea of budget waste associated with behavior that violates GARP. 
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The essence of revealed preference theory and GARP lies in the concept of indifference 
curves. Indifference curves show the different bundles of goods between which a decision 
maker is indifferent. In other words, indifference curves show the quantity of product X an 
individual is willing to sacrifice to get a certain quantity of product Y. A utility maximizing 
individual always wants to move to higher indifference curves as s/he gets better bundles of 
products, meaning that s/he can combine the same quantity of X with larger quantities of Y 
(see figure 2) and vice versa.  
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In the case of the above example, a choice that maximizes the utility of the available 
budget at prices p2, given the fact that the individual chose the combination A (X=8, Y=3) at 
prices p1, would be combinations placed on the dotted section of the budget line b2, for 
example the combination D (X=12, Y=2) in figure 3. Choosing these combinations would 
allow the individual to move to higher indifferences curves and end up with bundles 
containing larger quantities of products. However, choosing combination B (X=3, Y = 8) 
would not. As one can observe, GARP does not necessarily punish every change in 
preferences but merely those that are harmful for the efficient use of the available budget.  
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Afriat (1973) has introduced an efﬁciency index which can be used to measure the 
severity of GARP violations. This measure has been developed in the context of budget 
waste. As explained above, a violation of GARP can be interpreted as a waste of money. 
Basically, the Afriat Index measures the overall efficiency of individuals’ choices as the 
fraction of their budget that is wasted when GARP is violated (see Afriat (1973) and Varian 
(1990, 1991) for precise formal definitions). The index can take values between 0 and 1. A 
value of 1 means that there are no GARP violations (and no budget is wasted), whereas a 
value below 1 reveals that GARP is violated (with corresponding budget waste). Lower index 
values indicate that a larger fraction of the budget is wasted. In general, more severe 
inconsistencies in choices have a bigger impact on the Afriat Index. For example, the situation 
in the left panel of figure 4 implies a less severe GARP violation and, therefore, a higher 
value for the Afriat Index than the situation in the right panel of figure 4. 
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Several studies have used revealed preferences in experimental settings to investigate 
whether people behave consistently. Battalio et al. (1973) used data from choices made by 
female patients at a psychiatric hospital. Participants bought goods at a commissary, where 
the prices were arranged to change periodically. Between 5 and 50 percent of participants 
made choices that violated revealed preference axioms of choice consistency. In a sample of 
college students, Sippel (1997) studied choices for eight different consumption goods, using 
ten different budget sets. He found that more than 50% of participants violated GARP. 
However, both Sippel and Battalio et al. measured only the number of GARP violations and 
not the severity. 
Harbaugh et al. (2001) is one of the first studies that used GARP and the Afriat Index to 
investigate the severity of choice (in)consistencies in children by asking them to decide 
between bundles of food products. They found that although the level of choice consistency 
appeared already high at the age of seven, the 7-year olds behaved less consistently than the 
12 year-olds and the adults they studied. Andreoni & Miller (2002) investigated consistency 
of altruistic behavior using a modified version of a dictator game. They found a high degree 
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of heterogeneity between individuals: whereas some individuals behaved consistently 
altruistic or egoistic, others were quite inconsistent in their social preferences.  
We will rely on GARP and the Afriat Index in an experimental setting to obtain more 
insight in choice consistency and budget waste when individuals make decisions relying on 
intuitive versus cognitive processing. To calculate the Afriat Index we construct a choice task 
in which decision-makers have to choose between 4 products on 12 different occasions, and 
the prices of the products vary across occasions. Individuals have to go through this 
measurement twice, once using their intuition and once relying on cognition. This allows us to 
assess budget loss from choice behavior based on the two types of judgment separately. As 
the measurements are comparable, we can also calculate an overall Afriat Index as an 
indication of budget waste resulting from inconsistent choices made across both types of 
judgments. As such, these indices allow us to compare overall budget waste with budget 
waste caused by both types of judgments separately (cognitive versus intuitive). We use this 
rationale in two studies. 
 
Study 1 
The goal of the first study was to assess the extent of budget waste resulting from 
decisions relying more on cognitive versus intuitive judgment. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 138 students from a large university (43.9% women, average age 
20.43 years, SD=2.01). They were invited to come to the lab to complete a task designed to 
capture the severity of inconsistent choices, in exchange for money or course credit. 
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Participants came to the lab in groups of 10, and completed the task individually on a pc in a 
semi-enclosed cubicle.   
 
Design  
Procedure 
As a manipulation of cognitive and intuitive judgments we varied the visceral state 
hunger. A visceral state has a direct hedonic impact and influences the relative desirability of 
different goods and actions (Loewenstein, 1996). Its function is to grab the attention needed to 
ensure that certain actions are taken (e.g., obtaining food when hungry; Loewenstein, 2000). 
Visceral states function with minimal higher-level cognitive mediation, and thus can have a 
large influence on behavior without the interference of  cognitive deliberation (LeDoux, 1996; 
Loewenstein, 2000). In general, people who are in a visceral state tend to rely more on 
intuitive judgments than people who are not in a visceral state (Nordgren, et al., 
2007).Visceral influences have been associated with more intuitive and less deliberative 
behaviors such as over-eating (Loewenstein, 2000). In particular, hunger can lead to a variety 
of behaviors that can be characterized as more intuitive than cognitive. For instance, hungry 
people crave food more (Ditto et al., 2006), tend to forget about their weight goals (Nordgren, 
Van der Pligt  & Van Harreveld, 2008) and spend more, even on non-food objects (Xu , 
Schwarz & Wyer, 2015).  
We used a mixed design consisting of three between-subjects conditions: An 
experimental condition in which intuitive and cognitive judgments were activated sequentially 
during two choice-making episodes, and two control conditions in which only one of the two 
types of judgments was activated (intuitive or cognitive) during both choice-making episodes. 
In all conditions, the measurements were separated by one week (choice-making episodes 
were manipulated within-subjects). Similar to the design of Nordgren et al. (2007), in the 
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hungry (intuition) state participants were instructed to not eat for at least four hours prior to 
the study. In the satiated (cognition) state, participants were instructed to eat a full meal 
within the hour prior to the study. In the experimental condition, participants completed the 
choice task once hungry (intuition) and once satiated (cognition). The order of the tasks was 
counterbalanced, and did not influence the results. In the “cognition” control condition 
participants were asked to come to the lab satiated (eat a full meal within the hour prior to the 
study) both times, whereas in the “intuition” control condition participants were asked to 
come to the lab hungry both times. The purpose of the control conditions was to increase 
confidence that potential differences in the Afriat Index between sessions in the experimental 
condition could be attributed to differences between the two types of judgments, rather than to 
noise driven by the one week time lag in between experimental sessions.  
Revealed Preference Task: To be able to calculate the Afriat Index we created a choice 
task. Our task was similar to the one used in studies of Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Bruyneel et 
al. (2012). The task included 12 sequential choice problems, with each choice problem 
consisting of four products: two vice, relatively tasty but not so healthy (chocolate bar and 
Dorito chips) products and two virtue, relatively healthy but not so tasty (baby carrots and 
raisins) products. The prices of the products differed for every choice problem. Participants 
were asked to indicate the quantities they wanted from each product given the different price 
regimes and their budget (10 tokens). For every choice problem participants had to spend their 
entire budget and had the option to choose non-integer quantities. 
The price-income regime in the task (variation in prices and a fixed budget) implies a 
high power for testing choice consistency, which means that the probability of detecting 
inconsistent behavior is high (Bronars, 1987). High power arises from the fact that there is a 
lot of variation in prices and no income variation (Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2008). Table 1 
presents a summary of our choice task. 
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Table 1: Revealed Preferences Task  
Choice 
Problem 
Prices per 10 gr Budget 
 Carrots Raisins Chocolate 
Bar 
Dorito Chips  
1 5 3 4 4 10 
2 5 4 3 4 10 
3 5 4 4 3 10 
4 3 5 4 4 10 
5 4 5 3 4 10 
6 4 5 4 3 10 
7 3 4 5 4 10 
8 4 3 5 4 10 
9 4 4 5 3 10 
10 3 4 4 5 10 
11 4 3 4 5 10 
12 4 4 3 5 10 
 
Measures  
When completing the choice task, participants had to choose between virtue and vice 
products. To check whether the manipulation of cognitive versus intuitive processing was 
successful, we measured the relative occurrence of virtue and vice choices in both sessions. 
We expected choices in the hungry (intuition) state to be more vicious in nature than choices 
in the satiated (cognition) state. For every respondent we also calculated the Afriat Index for 
each session  separately, as well as the aggregated Afriat Index across both sessions (the type 
of judgment varied across sessions in the experimental condition but remained constant in the 
control conditions). We compared these three different indices to investigate differences in 
severity of choice inconsistencies and budget waste resulting from the different types of 
judgments.  
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Results and Discussion 
Product Choice 
A paired samples test showed that in the experimental condition, respondents chose more 
grams of vice products when hungry (intuition; Mhungry=211.99, SD=72.81) than when 
satiated (cognition; Msatiated=177.87, SD=82.20; t(66)=3.90, p<0.001) (see figure 5), whereas 
they chose fewer grams of virtue products when hungry (Mhungry=119.87, SD=70,38) than 
when satiated (Msatiated=149.52, SD=79.20; t(66)=3.49, p=0.001).  In the control conditions 
none of the differences were significant. Specifically, in the cognition control condition the 
quantities of vice and virtue products chosen in the first session (Mvice=186.89, SD=92.57; 
Mvirtue=132.55, SD=92.88) were not significantly different from those chosen in the second 
session (Mvice=184.14, SD=85.38; Mvirtue=135.58, SD=82.52; tvice(30)= 0.575, p=0.569; 
tvirtue(30)=-0.554, p=0.584). Similarly, in the intuition control condition the quantities of vice 
and virtue chosen in the first session (Mvice=178.00, SD=80.06; Mvirtue=148.77, SD=72.97) did 
not differ significantly from those chosen in the second session (Mvice=176.74, SD=84.66; 
Mvirtue=149.65, SD=79.22; tvice(39)= -0.230 p=0.819; tvirtue(39)=0.158, p=0.875).  
 
Additionally, we compared the differences between vice choices in the two sessions 
across conditions and did the same for virtues. The comparison showed that the difference in 
both vice and virtue choices for the two sessions was significantly larger in the experimental 
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condition than in the two control conditions (combined) (tvice(136)=3.884, p<0.001; 
tvirtue(136)=2.115, p=0.036). 
 
Budget Waste 
Comparing the Afriat Indices resulting from choices in both sessions in the experimental 
condition, we found that the difference was insignificant (Mhungry=0.972, SD=0.081; 
Msatiated=0.966, SD=0.054; Wilcoxon Z=-0.826, p=0.409). These results indicate that the 
proportion of the budget wasted was similar for both types of judgments (cognitive versus 
intuitive).  
We also calculated the overall Afriat Index across the two sessions (different types of 
judgments) in a way that allowed us to directly compare it with both indices resulting from 
choices relying on either type of judgment separately. This is possible as the power and thus 
reliability of the choice test depends by construction on three components: the number of 
observations, the price variation, and the choice of budget sets (Cherchye and Vermeulen 
2008). To meaningfully compare two Afriat Indices these components have to be the same. 
Therefore we constructed an overall Afriat Index with components that were identical to the 
ones of the separate indices. Specifically, we randomly picked six observations from each 
session dataset for each respondent to neutralize the fact that the Afriat Index is sensitive to 
the number of observations. We avoided picking the same price regime twice to secure that 
the price regime and the specific choice sets were identical with that of the within-sessions 
tests. This yielded a dataset consisting of 12 observations per individual that allowed us to 
calculate an overall, cross-states Afriat Index that was directly comparable to the separate, 
within session indices. We repeated the same procedure 200 times and calculated the average 
of the overall Afriat Index for every respondent. We observed that the overall index was 
significantly lower (Moverall=0.93, SD=0.077) than both indices calculated based on choices 
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relying on intuitive versus cognitive judgments, respectively (Z=-3.836, p<0.001 for intuition; 
Z=-3.169, p=0.002 for cognition). Percentage of budget wasted was approximately 3% for 
judgments relying on either intuition or cognition, whereas overall it was 7%. 
The difference between the indices in the cognition control condition were all 
insignificant. The Afriat Index calculated from choices in the first session (MSession1=0.954, 
SD=0.091) was not significantly different from the Afriat Index calculated from choices in the 
second session (MSession2=0.951, SD=0.119; Z=-0.568, p=0.570). In addition, these two 
indices were not significantly different from the overall index calculated from choices across 
sessions (Moverall=0.944, SD=0.106; Zsession1=-0.597, p=0.550, Zsession2=-1.232, p=0.218). The 
overall Afriat Index was calculated in the same way as the overall Afriat Index in the 
experimental condition (cf. supra). Results were similar for the intuition control condition. 
The index calculated from choices in the first session (MSession1=0.962, SD=0.077) was not 
significantly different from the index calculated from choices in the second session 
(MSession2=0.954, SD=0.087). Neither of these indices was different from the overall index 
calculated from choices across sessions (Moverall=0.952, SD=0.070; ZSession1=-1.232, p=0.218; 
ZSession2=-1.003, p=0.316).  
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Additionally, we calculated the absolute difference between the overall Afriat Index on 
the one hand and both separate Afriat Indices (which we averaged) on the other in all 
conditions, and compared these differences across conditions. We found that the difference 
(dexperimental =0.031) in the experimental condition was significantly larger than in the two 
(pooled) control conditions (dcontrol=0.006; t(136)=3.312, p=0.001).  
The findings of our first experiment suggest that the degree of choice inconsistency and 
budget waste resulting from either intuitive or cognitive judgments is comparable. Although 
choice behavior relying on intuition (hungry state) was more vicious (the quantity of vice 
products chosen was larger) compared with choice behavior relying on cognition (satiated 
state), choice inconsistencies and budget wasted resulting from both types of behaviors as 
measured by the Afriat Index were not significantly different. Specifically, budget wasted 
when relying on intuitive versus cognitive judgments was approximately 3% in both 
instances, indicating that respondents wasted only 3% of the budget on suboptimal choices 
regardless of whether they used their cognition or intuition to decide. However, the overall 
budget waste across types of judgments was significantly higher (7%). Thus, though loss of 
utility from choice behaviors relying on the different types of judgments was similar when 
assessed separately for each type of judgment, the preferences revealed by the two types of 
judgments had a negative impact on utility when pooled and assessed together.  
 
Study 2 
The aim of the second study was to replicate the results of the first study using another 
manipulation of intuitive versus cognitive judgment. To test the robustness of our results, in 
the second study we used another manipulation to trigger intuitive versus cognitive judgments 
that has been used in numerous studies in the past (e.g. Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Trope & 
Alfieri, 1997): cognitive load. Cognitive load prevents individuals from deliberating and 
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makes them use their intuition more (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Furthermore, we wanted to 
incentivize respondents to make utility maximizing choices by increasing the available budget 
in the choice task (from 10 to 20 tokens) and offering participants one of their choices at the 
end of the session. This is in contrast to study 1 where choices were hypothetical.    
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 118 students from a large university (60% women, average age 21.18 
years, SD=3.62). They were invited to come to the lab in exchange for money or course 
credit. 
 
Design 
Procedure 
We again made use of a mixed design including three between-subjects conditions, 
completed in two sessions (48 hours difference; manipulated within-subjects). Specifically, in 
the experimental condition a different type of judgment (once intuitive and once cognitive) 
was activated in each session (the order was counterbalanced and did not affect the results), 
whereas in the two control conditions the same type of judgment was activated (either 
intuitive or cognitive) in each session. Specifically, a cognitive load task was used as a 
manipulation of the two types of judgment. That is, participants were asked to keep in mind  a 
difficult sequence of 8 different consonants (e.g. GTPWLZKN, high cognitive load or 
intuitive judgment) or an easy sequence of 8 identical consonants (BBBBBBBB, low 
cognitive load or cognitive judgment) (Kruger, 1999). We reasoned that in the high cognitive 
load condition, the intuitive system would become relatively stronger than the cognitive 
system compared to the low cognitive load condition.  
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Participants were given a piece of paper displaying the sequence for 90 seconds, and 
were asked to memorize it. In the experimental condition, participants executed the decision 
task (similar to the one used in study 1) while keeping in mind the difficult sequence (intuitive 
judgment) in one of the two sessions, and while keeping in mind the easy sequence (cognitive 
judgment) in the other session. In the cognition control condition participants were asked to 
keep in mind the easy sequence while making their decisions in both of the sessions, whereas 
in the intuition control condition participants had to keep in mind the difficult sequence while 
making decisions in both of the sessions. All the participants managed to reproduce at least 
70% of the sequence and therefore all of them were kept in the analysis.  
Measures: Similar to the first study, participants had to choose quantities of four 
products (the same 2 virtues and the same 2 vices that were also used in study 1) in each of 
twelve choice situations with different price regimes. As mentioned above, the only difference 
compared to study 1 was that the budget for every choice exercise was doubled. Furthermore, 
participants were (truthfully) told that they would be entitled to one of their chosen product 
bundles at the end of every session. As a manipulation check we again measured the relative 
virtue and vice choices resulting from cognitive versus intuitive judgment. Furthermore, for 
every respondent we calculated the Afriat Index for choices resulting from each type of 
judgment separately and both types of judgments combined. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Product Choice 
A paired samples test showed again that in the experimental condition respondents chose 
more grams of vice products when they were under high cognitive load (intuitive; 
Mhighload=388.67, SD=150.21) than when they were under low load (cognitive; 
Mlowload=359.57, SD=169.98; t(62)=2.620, p=0.011), whereas they chose fewer grams of 
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virtue products when under high load (Mhighload=256.53, SD=145.57) than when under low 
load (Mlowload=280.05, SD=159.70; t(62)=2.302, p=0.025). In the control conditions none of 
the differences was significant. Specifically, in the cognition control condition the quantities 
of vice and virtue products chosen in the first session (Mvice=327.58, SD=146.87; 
Mvirtue=313.91, SD=143.32) were not significantly different from those chosen in the second 
session (Mvice=339.23, SD=152.04; Mvirtue=307.99, SD=138.94; tvice(23)= -0.981, p=0.337; 
tvirtue(23)=0.487, p=0.631). Similarly, in the intuition control condition the quantities of vice 
and virtue chosen in the first session (Mvice=394.28, SD=119.50; Mvirtue=255.51, SD=121.26) 
did not differ significantly from those chosen in the second session (Mvice=388.26, 
SD=128.29; Mvirtue=260.43, SD=125.61; tvice(27)= 0.417, p=0.680; tvirtue(27)=-0.336, p=0.740) 
(figure 7).  
 
Additionally, again we compared the difference in vice as well as virtue choices between 
sessions across conditions. The comparison showed once more that the difference in vice 
choices between sessions was significantly larger in the experimental condition than in the 
two control conditions. The difference in virtue choices between sessions was marginally 
significantly larger in the experimental condition than in the two control conditions 
(tvice(115)=1.992, p=0.049; tvirtue(115)=1.751, p=0.083). This pattern of choice confirms our 
expectations and replicates the findings of study 1. 
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Budget Waste 
As in study 1, the difference in the Afriat Indices resulting from choices in both sessions 
in the experimental condition (Mhighload=0.937, SD=0.108, Mlowload=0.941, SD=0.106) was 
insignificant (Wilcoxon Z=-0.077, p=0.939). These results again indicate that the proportion 
of the budget wasted was similar for both types of judgments (cognitive versus intuitive). 
After a similar processing of the data as in Study 1, we calculated the overall Afriat Index and 
compared it with the separate indices. The overall index was significantly lower 
(Moverall=0.913, SD=0.112) than the other two indices (Z=-2.144, p=0.032 for high load, Z=-
2.362, p=0.018 for low load). Percentage of budget wasted was approximately 6% for 
judgements relying on either intuition or cognition, whereas overall it was approximately 9%. 
As in Study 1, none of the differences between any of the indices in the control 
conditions was significant. In the cognition control condition, the Afriat Index calculated from 
choices in the first session (MSession1=0.943, SD=0.093) was not significantly different from 
the Afriat Index calculated from choices in the second session (MSession2=0.943, SD=0.123, 
Z=-0.063, p=0.950). In addition, these indices were not significantly different from the overall 
index calculated from choices across sessions (Moverall=0.931, SD=0.100; ZSession1=-0.511, 
p=0.609; ZSession2=-0.795, p=0.427). The results were similar for the intuition control 
condition. The index calculated from choices in the first session (MSession1=0.946, SD=0.110) 
was not significantly different from the index calculated from choices in the second session 
(MSession2=0.945, SD=0.113), and neither of these indices was different from the overall index 
(Moverall=0.939, SD=0.103; ZSession1=-0.621, p=0.535; ZSession2=-672, p=0.501). 
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As in Study 1, we calculated the absolute difference between the overall Afriat Index on 
the one hand and both separate Afriat Indices (which we averaged) on the other in all 
conditions, and compared these differences across conditions. Again, we found that the 
difference in the experimental condition (dexperimental=0.025) was significantly larger than in 
the two (pooled) control conditions (dcontrol=0.009; t(115)=2.110, p=0.037).  
The purpose of study 2 was to replicate the results of study 1, using a different 
manipulation of cognitive versus intuitive processing. The findings indicate, in line with study 
1, that the degree of choice inconsistency and budget waste resulting from behaviors relying 
on either intuitive or cognitive judgments is not significantly different, although the behaviors 
themselves (the actual choices being made) differ. However, once more we noticed a 
significant increase in budget waste when calculating the overall budget waste from choices 
made across situations. These results confirm that a significant waste of money results from 
conflicting behaviors triggered by the different types of judgments.  
 
General Discussion  
We conducted two studies to assess the degree of choice inconsistency from reliance on 
intuitive and cognitive judgment. We used two different ways to manipulate activation of 
intuitive versus cognitive judgment, and we measured budget wasted through inconsistent 
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choices using a task based on revealed preference theory. Results of both studies indicate that 
the extent of budget wasted resulting from choices relying on either of both types of 
judgments is not significantly different, despite the fact that product choices differ. We 
conclude that both types of judgments are equally appropriate to make consistent economic 
decisions. However, a further analysis revealed that the discrepancy between choices made 
under the influence of intuitive judgments on the one hand and cognitive judgments on the 
other had a significant impact on overall budget waste, as measured by the overall Afriat 
Index calculated from choices across situations in which intuitive and cognitive judgments 
were activated. This finding suggests that the discrepancy between choices resulting from the 
different types of judgment is responsible for a significant loss of decision utility.  
Our findings provide an answer to the question as to which type of judgment leads to 
more severe choice inconsistencies. Our studies are the first to estimate how severe 
inconsistent choices resulting from intuitive versus cognitive judgment are. Our findings show 
that both types of judgments lead to an equal degree of choice inconsistency. Previous studies 
showing that cognitive judgment leads to more choice inconsistency have measured either the 
number of transitivity errors (Lee et al., 2009) or the extent of attitude inconsistency towards 
products (Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009). However, transitivity errors differ in terms of their 
impact on budget waste (Harbaugh et al., 2001; Echenique, Lee, & Shum, 2011), as does the 
degree of attitude inconsistency. The authors attributed the choice and attitude inconsistencies 
they observed to cognitive noise, but our data suggest that cognitive noise may have a minor 
impact on overall budgeting efficiency. Furthermore, another research stream suggesting that 
intuitive judgment leads to less optimal choice making (Van den Bergh, Dewitte & Warlop, 
2008; Shiv et al., 2005) has identified these suboptimal choices as biased by affective noise 
related to intuitive processes. Our data however suggest that affective noise only has a minor 
impact on overall budgeting efficiency. Although intuitive judgments have been found to lead 
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to some types of suboptimal decisions such as temporal discounting and more risk seeking, 
there is a set of findings suggesting that intuition is not by definition harmful and that its 
impact depends on the context and the type of decisions (e.g. Pocheptsova et al., 2009).  
Compared to previous research studying the influence of cognitive versus intuitive 
judgment on choice consistency, our study is the first to include some important components 
in the experimental setting that have been ignored by previous studies: 1) a non-binary setting 
(respondents had to choose between more than two products), 2) the use of budget constraints 
and 3) the price variation. Theses added components may also have contributed to the 
discrepancy between previous findings and ours. Binary choice settings and pairwise 
comparisons have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to changes in attribute importance 
(Rieskamp, Busemeyer & Mellers, 2006). Furthermore, available budgets and prices are 
important drivers of economic decisions, as they set the broader context under which these 
decisions take place and thus define the level of consistent behavior (Becker, 1962; 1993; 
Samuelson, 1938). We show both types of judgments to be equally appropriate for making 
consistent economic decisions. The symmetry in our findings suggests that the decision 
making rules followed by intuition and cognition in economic contexts involving price 
regimes and budget constraints might not be all that different. This is consistent with recent 
proposals suggesting that cognitive and intuitive judgments can be based on common 
principles in certain environments (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Specifically, Kruglanski 
& Gigerenzer (2011) argue that in some environments in which relevant cues are set (for 
example in our case the budget constraints and price regimes) and the decisions are made 
sequentially, the two types of judgments will rely on the same rules to reach a decision. By 
rules the authors refer to the inferential devices used for categorization, estimation, paired 
comparisons, and other judgmental tasks that go beyond the given information.  
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Our findings can be related to literature on affective forecasting errors and hot-cold (and 
cold-hot) empathy gaps. Kahneman & Thaler (2006) argued that when people make choices 
they tend to forecast utility of an outcome. When the forecast is wrong, decision-makers 
experience loss of utility in the future. For example, a very hungry shopper doing his/her 
weekly shopping at the beginning of the week may buy very large portions of food or a 
greater variety in food products, and end up having (too much) food at home that s/he does 
not like very much. On the other hand, satiated shoppers who underestimate the value of 
hedonic products will focus on a specific set of goods, and end up with a basket of products 
that they do not really want to consume when hungry. In both cases, wrong forecasting results 
in loss of experienced utility at time of consumption (Kahneman & Thaler, 2006). Although 
we did not directly test forecasting errors, we show how the gap between the two types of 
judgments prevents individuals from forming global preferences that will enable them to 
make more optimal decisions. A hungry shopper (relying on intuitive judgments) forms 
his/her preferences between various products as if the importance of the products and their 
prices will still be the same for him/her when satiated (when s/he will be relying on cognition 
to make his/her choices). Our findings show that the actual dissimilarity in the preferences can 
lead to severe inconsistencies which end up in a significant waste of budget from an overall 
perspective.  
We contribute to the literature on economic decision making by showing that loss of 
utility due to inconsistent choices is not a result of the decisions driven by one specific type of 
judgment directly, but of the conflicting choices driven by these two types of judgment 
separately instead. Our findings suggest that, although the levels of waste of budget resulting 
from either intuition or cognition is not different, the discrepancy between choices resulting 
from these two different types of judgment can lead to more severe suboptimal choices and 
significant budget waste. We speculate that in order to reach the indifference levels that allow 
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them to choose products, individuals using either intuition or cognition give weights to the 
attributes of the products, which very often differ. For instance, “taste” is perceived and 
weighted as more important by intuition than by cognition (Fisher & Rangel, 2014). One 
result of such a dissimilarity in attribute weights is that the levels of indifference between 
various products reached by both types of judgment are different (Goldstein, 1990). Such 
dissimilar indifference levels should prevent decision-makers from moving to higher 
indifference curves and thus optimize the use of their budgets across decision situations in 
which they rely on different types of judgments.  
It has to be highlighted that the consistency violations we detect from an overall  
perspective are not just changes in preferences. They are miscalculations in individuals’ 
economic logic that are severe enough to cause significant budget loss. The Afriat Index and 
GARP allow changes in preferences without necessarily punishing those. Figure 9 exhibits 
how individuals can change their preferences and in one instance for example choose a bundle 
with larger quantities of vice products (for example when using their intuition; choice B) and 
in another instance choose a bundle of goods containing larger quantities of virtue products 
(for example when using their cognition; choice A) without violating GARP (and thus without 
wasting budget). Future research can investigate ways of dealing with the discrepancy in 
preferences between both types of judgment in a more economically optimal way. In other 
words, future research could investigate how to help individuals make choices which comply 
with diverging preferences between the two types of judgment, and at the same time not waste 
budget.  
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Taking a broader perspective, our results suggest that self-control strategies characterized 
by anticipation of an upcoming event and the deployment of certain means to prevent one’s 
future self from acting on desire, can have a negative impact on preference consistency. 
Employing strategies such as counteractive self-control, guilt, or other complex incentive 
schemes (e.g. Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Fishbach, Dhar & Zhang, 2006) which bring 
more conflict between the two types of judgment might lead to more suboptimal choices from 
an overall perspective. For instance, a hungry shopper trying to suppress the weight of an 
attribute such as taste (counteractive self-control) might reach indifference levels between 
products that differ from the levels reached in a hungry as well as from those reached in a 
satiated state (as preferences across types of judgment seem hard to predict). Creating a third 
level of indifference may drive the overall waste of budget to even higher levels. Techniques 
aimed at increasing the connection between intuition and cognition might yield better results. 
Bartels & Urminsky (2011) found that increasing the connection between current and future 
self by using techniques such as manipulating perceived stability of one’s identity decreased 
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temporal discounting rates.  Similarly, Goukens et al. (2009) showed that highlighting one’s 
identity by promoting self-awareness led to more stable preferences and reduced decision 
biases. We speculate that such treatments may increase the cross-state alignment and reduce 
overall budget waste. Future research could test this hypothesis. 
Furthermore, recent findings suggested that some product attributes have a larger impact 
on discrepancy in evaluations between intuitive and cognitive judgments. For example taste 
ratings (for the same products) are different when people are hungry compared with when 
they are satiated, whereas healthiness ratings do not differ (Fisher & Rangel, 2014). Future 
research could investigate which product attributes lead to more severe choice inconsistencies 
and hence to more severe budget inefficiency. These findings could potentially inform us on 
how different packaging and advertising strategies could contribute to making individuals’ 
choices more optimal.  
Future studies could investigate whether certain personality traits may moderate the effect 
of internal or external cues shifting the balance between intuition and cognition, and hence 
budget waste, because they chronically make one of the two systems relatively more 
dominant. Trait self-control may reduce the influence of intuitive judgment, which would lead 
to fewer discrepancies between the two types of judgment, to less choice inconsistencies, and 
to less budget waste.  
Future research could also shed more light on forecasting errors and budget misuse by 
assessing the Afriat Index (both individual and overall) of choices made in an intuitive state 
when in fact making decisions for a cognitive state and vice versa. The findings of such a 
study could help us to further understand whether and how it is possible to better connect 
preferences of different types of judgments in order to have a positive influence on the overall 
rationality. Understanding the ways intuition and cognition can be connected will provide 
opportunities to improve individuals’ welfare.   
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ESSAY 2: RESOURCE SCARCITY, SOCIOECONOMIC 
STATUS AND CONFORMITY: THE IMPACT OF RESOURCE 
SCARCITY ON RESPONSES TO SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
DEPEND ON CHILDHOOD ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
Abstract: Resource scarcity has been found to have a significant impact on peoples’ behavior. 
We investigate whether it also impacts individuals’ responses to social influence attempts. 
Drawing on life history theory we show that the effect of resource scarcity on peoples’ 
responses to social influence depend on childhood economic background. In three studies we 
find that an environmental stressor like resource scarcity increases conformity among people 
who grew up in low socio-economic status environments but does not have the same effect 
among people who grew up in high socio-economic status environments. 
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Introduction 
The economic turmoil of the past years has increased the number of people 
experiencing financial insecurity (World Health Organization, 2014). Experiencing resource 
scarcity is a stressful state that can have a significant impact on different aspects of 
individuals’ behavior (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). One aspect of behavior that has been found 
to be influenced by stressful and threatening situations is the response to social influence or 
conformity (Griskevicius et al., 2006). Social influence can have a substantial impact on 
consumers' decision making (Wood & Hayes, 2012). For instance, social norms are used as 
tools for changing behaviors such as unhealthy eating, smoking, drug use, gambling, and as 
marketing tools for making products more appealing in numerous advertising campaigns (e.g. 
Donaldson, Graham, & Hansen, 1994; Schultz, 1999; Larimer & Neighbors, 2003; Goldstein 
et al., 2008). Social norms are thus fundamental in the economic fabric, and the question 
arises as to how resource scarcity may affect conformity. Earlier findings suggest that 
financial constraints might enhance consumers’ sensitivity to social influence (e.g. Christen & 
Morgan, 2005; Drèze & Nunes, 2011) but it is not clear how general this phenomenon is.  
In this paper, we use life-history theory to examine the moderating role of childhood 
socioeconomic background on the impact of resource scarcity on conformity. Recent studies 
have suggested that individuals’ responses to resource scarcity can be adaptive. These studies 
used life-history theory to show that behavior of individuals facing adversities such as 
resource scarcity depends on their childhood socioeconomic background (Ellis, Figueredo, 
Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009; Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Griskevicius et al., 2013). We 
begin the paper with an exposition on life-history strategies and their expected influence on 
conformity under conditions of resource scarcity. We next present the results of three studies 
testing our predictions.    
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Life-History Theory  
Life-history theory attempts to understand how organisms make use of the available  
resources to maximize their fitness (Roff, 2002; Stearns, 1992). According to life-history 
theory, all living organisms face trade-offs with regard to decisions of how to allocate their 
available resources. Empirical research in various fields such as animal behavior (Ellis et al., 
2009), human behavior, and child development (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Del 
Giudice, 2009; Hill & Kaplan, 1999) has provided evidence on the existence of life-history 
strategies.  
Life-history strategies vary along a slow-to-fast continuum, in accordance with how 
individuals resolve life-history trade-offs (Ellis et al., 2009; Figueredo et al., 2005; Nettle, 
2010). Slow and fast strategies have their own distinctive features. At a physiological level, 
faster strategies are associated with earlier development and sexual maturity whereas slower 
strategies are linked with later development and sexual maturity. With regard to psychological 
reactions, fast strategies are linked with disregard for future consequences and opportunism 
whereas slow strategies are associated with long-term planning and delaying gratification with 
a view to increase future payoffs. These are only a few examples of how life history strategies 
can influence human behavior.  
Adoption of fast or slow strategies, which extends into adult life, is partly determined by 
specific features of the childhood environment (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Kuzawa 
et al., 2010). More unpredictable and harsh childhood environments lead individuals to enact 
faster strategies, which results in earlier physiological development and sexual maturation 
(Belsky, Houts, & Fearon, 2010). For instance, environments characterized by higher 
mortality lead people to have their first child at an earlier age (Griskevicius et al., 2011; Low 
et al., 2008). Enacting fast strategies associated with immediate reproduction instead of 
waiting for long-term payouts is evolutionarily adaptive for organisms living in environments 
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where life span is shorter (Griskevicius et al., 2013; Chisholm et al., 1993). In contrast 
however, environments involving less unpredictability and harshness favor the enactment of 
slower strategies associated with delaying reproduction and more parental investment in 
infants (Ellis et al., 2009). 
Recent economic studies showed that early childhood backgrounds are very influential 
for later adult life of individuals. Heckman et al. (2010a) and Heckman et al. (2013) showed 
that childhood environments can have a diverging impact on adult outcomes including 
achievement on education, length of marriage and participation in healthy and criminal 
behaviors. Malmendier et al. (2011) showed that the condition people face in their childhood 
can have an impact on their dependence on external funding in their adult life.  
 
The expression of life history strategies 
Although physiological changes associated with the adoption of slow versus fast 
strategies seem fixed through life, psychological changes are more sensitive to situational 
influences. Recent findings (Griskevicius, et al, 2011) showed that childhood environment 
can sensitize people to use a specific set of life history strategies; the behavioral tendencies 
associated with this specific set of strategies are especially likely to emerge in stressful 
situations. Behavioral tendencies associated with fast and slow strategies may lie dormant in 
benign conditions. Therefore, adults who grew up in different childhood environments may 
often behave in similar ways when current levels of stress are low. However, the same 
individuals are expected to show diverging behaviors when facing stressors in their current 
adult environment.  
Neuroscientific work on animals provides support for the suggestion above (e.g. Bagot 
et al., 2009; Champagne et al., 2008). Studies showed that adult rats that grew up in a more 
adverse environment (i.e., low levels of maternal licking and grooming) outperformed those 
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who grew up in a less adverse environment on learning tasks. This difference was found only 
in stressful contexts. The results of these studies suggest that early life environments influence 
neural development and functioning which in adult life is used only in stressful contexts. This 
is adaptive as life-history strategies are adopted in order to help adult organisms cope with 
environmental adversities (Bagot et al., 2009; Champagne et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, several behavioral studies in humans have provided support for these life 
history strategies sensitization models (Griskevicius et al., 2013; Griskevicius, et al., 2011; 
Hill et al., 2013; White et al., 2013). For example, in one study, Griskevicius et al. (2013) 
showed that reading news articles about the economic difficulties current societies face, low-
SES childhoods individuals exhibited responses associated with a faster strategy as they 
became more risk seeking and impulsive. By contrast, people coming from high-SES 
childhood environments reacted in a way that can be linked with a slower strategy; the 
exhibited less risk seeking and impulsive tendencies. In conclusion, people respond to 
stressors in their current adult environment (such as resource scarcity) by enacting strategies 
learned throughout their childhood.  
 
Life history strategies and conformity 
Conformity is a behavioral strategy designed and targeted to match or imitate the behavior, 
beliefs and expectations of other individuals (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Numerous studies have 
shown that conformity can be highly prevalent (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). In 
evolutionary literature, conformity is defined as a form of social learning (Boyd & Richerson, 
1985). According to that literature, individuals have two different ways to acquire 
information: individual learning in which humans acquire information through 
experimentation and trial-and-error, and social learning which involves the acquisition of 
information by copying others  (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 1988; Toelch et al., 2008). 
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Individual and social learning are usually used adaptively by humans as they both have 
advantages and disadvantages. Individual learning is more costly and time consuming as it 
involves more effort and requires more resources, but it tends to be more accurate and 
reliable. On the other hand, social learning is less costly but also less accurate and reliable 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Laland, 2004). Individuals use both types of learning 
interchangeably depending on which type of strategy is more suitable to the circumstances 
they live in.  
Harsh and unpredictable environments are characterized by increased dangers and 
mortality. In addition, available resources are limited, therefore, in those environments 
organisms have limited energy to spare (Ellis et al., 2009). This makes the acquisition of 
information through individual learning difficult and in many cases dangerous. When 
information is highly costly to be acquired with individual learning, individuals turn to social 
learning to acquire information (Boyd & Richerson, 1998; McElreath et al., 2005; Morgan et 
al., 2011). On the other hand, in less harsh environments, resources are more abundant, and 
risks and mortality are less salient. In more benign situations, individual learning can be an 
adaptively more efficient strategy as it is considered to be more accurate and might therefore 
yield better results (Boyd & Richerson, 1998; McElreath, R. et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2011). 
As a result, we expect individuals raised in harsh childhood environments (where individual 
learning is too costly) to be sensitized to acquire information through social learning, while 
we expect people raised in less harsh environments to be sensitized to be more independent 
and use less social learning.  
Some recent findings provide some preliminary support for our expectations. 
Observational studies show that lower SES children play in closer proximity to other children, 
relative to high SES children (Scherer, 1974; Stipek & Ryan, 1997). Moreover, Kraus and 
Keltner (2009) show that low SES people pay more attention to social context than high SES 
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individuals, and are more motivated to behave in ways that increase social interaction and 
connection with others. This expectation is consistent with earlier findings showing that high 
SES people have a greater sense of agency than low SES individuals. High SES individuals 
also place greater value on their own choices and preferences than low SES individuals 
(Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens, Markus & Townsend, 2007). 
In conclusion, we expect that individuals who grew up in low SES environments will have 
been sensitized to acquire information more through social learning and thus will be more 
susceptible to conformity (cf. Boyd & Richerson, 1985), whereas people who grew up in high 
SES environments will have been less sensitized to acquire information through social 
learning and thus will be less likely to use strategies such as conformity. Given earlier 
findings that behavioral tendencies associated with a specific set of strategies are especially 
likely to emerge in stressful situations (Griskevicius et al., 2011), we expect behaviors 
associated with the use of social learning as life-history strategies to manifest themselves in 
conditions of resource scarcity.   
In three studies, we show that resource scarcity cues indeed lead people coming from poor 
backgrounds to behave in a more conformist way, whereas these cues do not have an impact 
on rich peoples’ tendencies to conform.  
 
Study 1 
The goal of the first study was to test our hypothesis with well-established measures and 
manipulations of the three core variables.  
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Method  
Participants 
Five hundred and fifty three participants were drawn from Crowdflower (317 female, 
Mage=38.07, SD=12,62). They received a small monetary fee as a compensation. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two threat conditions: a resource scarcity 
or a control condition. In both conditions, participants read an article that, so they were told, 
recently appeared in a popular newspaper. In the resource scarcity condition, the article 
described the highly uncertain economic climate (e.g. Griskevicius et al., 2013). In the control 
condition, participants read an article (similar in length and style) that described a person who 
lost track of his father in a metro station. Results of a pretest showed that the article in the 
economic uncertainty condition elicited feelings of resource scarcity more than the article in 
the control condition.   
Conformity was assessed in the following way. We presented  participants with a 
description of a product (cereals) together with the average consumer rating from a popular 
online store. The average rating was relatively high: 9.25 out of 11. Then participants were 
asked to rate how much they liked the product and how useful they found it (1 not at all; 11 
extremely) (Galinski et al., 2008). Conformity was assessed by checking how highly 
participants rated the product, with higher ratings indicating more conformity.  
Perceived childhood and current SES were assessed using established measures 
(Griskevicius et al., 2011). Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with six 
statements on a 9-point scale (e.g. “My family usually had enough money for things when I 
was growing up”). In line with previous studies, none of our findings were significant when 
53 
 
we used current SES instead of childhood SES (e.g. Griskevicius et al., 2013); therefore these 
results were omitted from our analysis. 
 
Results and discussion 
A regression predicting the ratings from the resource scarcity cue, childhood SES, and 
their interaction showed a significant resource scarcity × childhood SES interaction, t(549) = -
2.97, p = 0.003, β = −0. 355). Following previous studies measuring childhood SES 
(Griskevicius et al., 2011; Aiken & West, 1991), we conducted a spotlight analysis at one 
standard deviation (SD) above and below the mean of childhood SES. Spotlight analysis is a 
post hoc test used in regression to analyze interactions. The simple slopes of one independent 
variable are examined at specific values of the other independent variable (one SD below and 
above the mean). In essence spotlight analysis recalculates the effect of the one independent 
variable (in our case resource scarcity cues) two times; one as if all participants would score 
one SD below the mean of childhood SES and another one as if all participant would score 1 
SD above the mean of childhood SES. Results indicated that resource scarcity made 
individuals who grew up relatively poor (one SD below the mean) conform more, as they 
rated the product significantly higher (t(549) = 2.741, p = 0.006, β = 0.710) than low SES 
individuals in the control condition. However, for people from high-SES backgrounds (+1 
SD), resource scarcity reduced conformity but ratings were not significantly different in the 
scarcity condition than in the control condition, t(549) = -1.462, p = 0.144, β = −0.400 (see 
Figure 10).  
The first experiment showed that resource scarcity cues had a different effect on 
conformity depending on the economic conditions under which people grew up. People who 
grew up relatively poor responded to resource scarcity cues by conforming. This was not the 
case for individuals who grew up relatively rich. 
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Study 2 
Because financial crises hit people not just collectively but often differentially, we 
wanted to assess whether the effect of Study 1 would replicate using an individual financial 
constraint as an actual stressor. We also wanted to verify that the results in study 1 were 
driven by tendencies to conform rather than just resulting from a change in preferences 
trigged by the resource scarcity cues. We therefore added a condition in which we provided 
participants with negative consumer reviews of the product.  
 
Method  
Participants 
For the second study, nine hundred and ninety participants were drawn from Crowdflower 
(618 women, Mage=38.70, SD=12.54). They received a small monetary compensation.  
 
Procedure  
To prime resource scarcity we used a manipulation designed by Zhou, Vohs & 
Baumeister  (2009). In the scarcity condition participants were asked to list their monetary 
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expenditures from the past 30 days, whereas in the control condition participants were 
instructed to write about the weather conditions during the past 30 days. Conformity was 
assessed after presenting participants with the same description of a product (cereals) as in 
study 1, together with consumer review scores from a popular online store. The average 
consumer reviews were either positive (9.25 out of 11) or negative (2.58 out of 11). 
Childhood and current socioeconomic background were assessed the same way as in study 1.  
 
Results and Discussion             
For the positive ratings (see Figure 2), findings showed the same pattern as in study 1. 
The interaction between childhood SES and financial deprivation was significant (t(472) = -
3.866, p < 0.001, β = −0. 468). For those from low-SES backgrounds (−1 SD), resource 
scarcity increased conformism (t(472) = 2.001, p = 0.045, β = 0.604), as participants in the 
resource scarcity condition rated the product significantly higher than low-SES individuals in 
the control condition. For those from high-SES backgrounds (+1 SD), scarcity not only failed 
to increase conformism but even significantly decreased it (t(472) = -3.371, p < .001, β = 
−1,751) as it made people rate the product lower. 
For the negative ratings (see Figure 12) we again observed that the interaction between 
childhood SES and scarcity was significant (t(510) = 2.091, p = 0.037, β = 0.276). Resource 
scarcity made low SES people rate the product significantly lower (t(510) = -2.136, p =0.033, 
β = -0.659), indicating a higher degree of conformity, whereas the same cue did not have an 
impact on high SES people (t(510) = 1.011, p =0.312, β = 0. 366).  
Our second study replicates the results of the first study, and extends them for 
individually afflicted resource scarcity and negative consumer reviews. We observed that for 
both negative and positive ratings, resource scarcity made people from poor backgrounds 
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relative conformists, whereas it did not have the same effect on people from rich 
backgrounds.  
  
 
 
Study 3  
In the third study we sought to gather field evidence for our effect, as well as investigate the 
extent to which our findings are generalizable across cultures. Therefore, we analyzed data 
from the World Values Survey, which aims to explore people’s values and beliefs around the 
globe. The World Values Survey combines nationally conducted surveys in 77 countries. We 
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analyzed data collected in the last wave (wave 6) of the survey (World Values Survey 
Association, 2014). 
 
Method 
Participants 
The study included seventy eight thousand and nine hundred and twenty one participants 
from the sixth wave of the World value survey (40616 women, Mage= 41.56, SD = 16.26). 
Measures 
As a proxy for childhood SES we used an item measuring the income group participants 
indicated they currently belonged to (1 lowest group – 10 highest group). Although in our 
experiments and small samples we failed to observe effects for current SES instead of 
childhood SES, recent findings show that in large datasets current SES can serve as a good 
proxy for childhood SES, and as a result also for the adoption of different life-history 
strategies (Griskevicius et al., 2011).  
As a measure of resource scarcity threats we used an item measuring participants’ 
satisfaction with the financial situation of their household (1 = Completely Dissatisfied – 10 = 
Completely Satisfied; reversed scaled). Financial dissatisfaction has been used by several 
studies in the past as a proxy for perceived resource scarcity (e.g. Haisley, Mostafa & 
Loewenstein, 2008). Individuals (even when objectively wealthy) can experience 
dissatisfaction and feelings of resource scarcity when comparing their financial states to those 
of wealthier counterparts and/or to their own states during more wealthy times (Sharma & 
Alter, 2013). The correlation between scales of current income and financial satisfaction was 
moderate (r=0.34). We checked for multicollinearity problems between both variables, but 
found none (VIF=1.13).  
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As a conformity measure we chose an item probing for  participants’ perceived 
similarity to a person who considers it important to always behave properly; to avoid doing 
anything other people would say is wrong (1 = Not at all like me– 6 = Very much like me; 
reverse scaled). This item had been taken from Schwartz’s (2012) Value Survey and was 
designed to measure individuals’ tendency to conform. In our analysis, we reversed the scales 
for items measuring financial satisfaction and conformity. 
 
Results and discussion 
A regression showed that the interaction between the proxy for childhood SES and 
financial dissatisfaction (resource scarcity) on the dependent variable (conformism) was 
significant (t(78917) = -4.84, p < 0.001, β = -0.004). In line with our hypotheses, financial 
dissatisfaction significantly increased poor participants’ tendencies to conform (t(78917) = 
6.51, p < 0.001, β = 0.02). For those from a rich background however, financial dissatisfaction 
did not have an effect on their tendencies to conform (t(78917) = 0.25, p = 0.80, β = 0.002). 
Additionally, we run complementary regression analysis by including some important control 
variables (gender, age, education) to check the robustness of our findings. The analysis 
yielded again a significant interaction between SES and financial satisfaction (t(78224) = -
4.87, p < 0.001, β = -0.004). The third study replicates the results of the previous studies in a 
multicultural field setting and with different measures, and thus increases the reliability and 
generalizability of our results.  
 
General Discussion 
Normative information has been found to have a significant impact on consumers’  
decision making (Goldstein, Cialdini & Griskevicius, 2008; Wood & Hayes, 2012). The 
present study provides an answer to the question as to whether resource scarcity leads 
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individuals to conform to normative information. Findings of three studies showed that 
resource scarcity had a markedly different effect on conformity depending on whether people 
reported having grown up in a relatively resource-scarce or resource-abundant environment. 
For people who grew up in relatively resource-scarce environments, resource scarcity cues 
increased conformism. Resource scarcity cues did not increase conformism in people who 
grew up in relatively resource-abundant environments, however.  
The fact that exposure to specific childhood environments had the observed differential 
effects on conformity is consistent with the notion that social learning can be more useful and 
adaptive when acquiring information through individual learning is difficult. Individual 
learning however can be more useful in environments where the cost of exploration and 
experimentation for acquiring information is not so high (Boyd & Richerson, 1998; 
McElreath et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2011).  
Conformity has historically been found to be a significant variable in the social 
psychology literature (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Furthermore, recent findings show the 
existence of conformity in animals (Whiten et al., 2005; Dindo et al., 2009; Pike & Laland, 
2010). However, the answer to the question as to how widespread conformity can be and 
whether some individuals deviate from the norms more than others is still not clear (Henrich 
& Boyd, 1998; Kendal et al., 2009; Morgan & Laland, 2012). Some scholars argue that the 
level of conformity depends on social motives (e.g. Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Griskevicius 
et al., 2006), whereas other studies argue that it depends on individual differences (Efferson et 
al., 2008). We propose that one important variable that provides additional insights in the 
debate on the level of conformity is socioeconomic background.  
The findings of our experiments are the first to connect conformity with a specific set of 
life-history strategies.  We call upon future research to explore the effects of life-history 
strategies on conformity further. Future research could for instance try to replicate the results 
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using different threat cues (e.g. mortality cues) and measuring childhood SES in different 
ways (e.g., recall of objective household income during childhood). Literature on life history 
strategies finds that people sensitized in a specific set of strategies use them after being 
primed with extrinsic resource scarcity cues. To our knowledge, the present study is the first 
to also use more intrinsic manipulations of resource scarcity (i.e., feelings of personal 
financial deprivation; studies 2 and 3). Our results suggest that intrinsic resource scarcity cues 
can also trigger life history strategies. Future research could investigate whether the findings 
of our study hold for other types of intrinsic resource scarcity cues such as hunger.  
Our studies tested the effect of resource scarcity cues on individuals’ tendencies to 
conform with social suggestions or norms that can be characterized as descriptive. Descriptive 
norms usually involve perceptions of the type of behaviors typically performed. Future 
endeavors could investigate our proposed effect for norms that are more injunctive such as lay 
theories. Future research could also try to extend our findings by testing other factors that 
could have a different impact such as the level of individuals’ expertise on the topic of the 
norm, the salience of the norm, the level of uncertainty of the norm, and the extent of 
identification with the reference group.  
Our findings have some useful implications for marketers and policy makers. They 
show that persuasion efforts using normative social suggestions might not yield the expected 
results under certain circumstances. For example, advertising messages and campaigns 
containing environmental harshness cues coupled with normative suggestions might be 
ineffective for some individuals. Furthermore, in times of economic recessions where a big 
part of the population experiences resource scarcity, persuasions efforts including social 
influence cues could prove unproductive for that part of the population that has been raised in 
a relatively rich environment. Hence, such efforts should be targeted to low childhood SES 
individuals more directly. 
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The present research addressed the question as to how individuals who experience 
resource scarcity behave towards social norms. We propose that this effect depends on 
childhood socioeconomic environment. We use life-history theory which dictates that 
individuals get sensitized to a specific set of strategies during childhood, which they use later 
in life whenever they feel threatened. These strategies are not “good” neither “bad”. As life 
history theory suggests, they are adaptive. Behaviors associated with the different strategies 
are simply outcomes of mental mechanisms designed to adapt optimally to life’s 
circumstances. 
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ESSAY 3: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECT OF 
MATING TACTICS ON ECONOMIC RISK-TAKING 
 
 
Abstract: Every day individuals are called to take financial decisions that involve an element 
of risk. Numerous studies have tried to explain why individuals choose to incorporate or not 
this element of risk in their decision making process. In line with recent taking a more 
evolutionary perspective on the topic we suggest that differences in mating tactics can be an 
important variable influencing risk-taking. In two experiments we show that the level of 
financial risk-taking depends on the type of mating tactics people choose to adopt. 
Specifically, we find that when mating goals are salient financial risk-taking decreases for 
individuals adopting long-term mating tactics but not for individuals adopting short-term 
tactics.   
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Introduction 
Each day, individuals make financial decisions large and small, many of which involve 
an element of risk. A body of the literature suggests that risky decision-making is influenced  
by emotions, goals, and other drive states (Baker & Maner, 2009). Although research has 
provided a psychologically more proximate account (how it is happening?) for variables 
influencing risky decision-making, many studies fall short of identifying the underlying social 
functions that risk-taking serves. Providing a more ultimate explanation (why it is 
happening?) on the reasons behind risky decision making is important in order to understand 
decision making better and help individuals improve their decision making. Recent studies 
taking a more evolutionary perspective suggest that financial risk-taking is connected with 
individual differences that are tied to more fundamental motives (e.g. self-protection and 
reproduction; Griskevicius & Kenrick, 2013). In line with recent findings we propose that 
differences in mating tactics can be an important variable influencing risk-taking.  
Mating is universal in human societies and one of the main drivers of human behavior 
(e.g. Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). The duration of a mating 
relationship is not always long-term, it can range from few hours to several decades. 
Evolutionary theories on human mating argue that individuals have two main mating tactics, 
“long-” and “short-” term tactics (e.g. Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). 
This flexible mating design allows individuals to respond adaptively in a wide variety of 
circumstances. Mating strategies have been found to have a highly significant impact on the 
decisions which are directly associated with reproduction, for instance the choice of partner 
(Simpson & Gangestad, 1992). Recent findings show that mating strategies can have an 
influence on decisions which are of a more economic nature and not directly linked to 
reproduction, such as conspicuous consumption and bet-hedging (Sundie and colleagues, 
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2011; Durante & Arsena, 2014). Building on the findings of previous studies we show that 
mating tactics have an impact on financial risk taking.  
We organize the article as follows. First, we review the literature on mating tactics and 
their impact on decision making. Next, we report the findings of our two studies. Last, we 
conclude with the discussion of our results and their implications.  
 
Risk-Taking Preferences 
In economics risk-taking is usually defined in terms of the variance of possible 
monetary outcomes. It is defined as the preference for a higher variance payoff given the fact 
that the expected value is constant (Schonberg, Fox & Poldrack, 2010). One of the first 
studies assessing financial risk-taking in individuals found that individuals are generally risk 
averse (Pratt, 1964). Specifically it found that when individuals compare sure payment to an 
option that involves risk with equal or even higher expected value, they prefer the sure 
payment. This aversion towards risk explains why individuals usually prefer higher returns for 
more risky investments.  
However, recent research has shown that there are plenty of variables that can change 
individuals’ preference towards risk. Several motivational or contextual factors have been 
shown to have an impact on risk-taking. Emotions can alter risk preferences. For example 
feeling angry (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) or powerful (Inesi, 2010) lead to more risk taking. 
Visceral influences can potentially also have a significant effect on risk preferences (Ariely & 
Loewenstein, 2006; Ditto et al., 2006; Baker & Maner, 2008). Ditto et al., (2006) increased 
people’s  risk-taking by making them feel hungry. Last, personality traits such as low self-
control, impulsivity and sensation-seeking have been associated with more risk preferences 
(Zuckerman, 2007).  
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From an evolutionary perspective, one of the main functions of risk-taking behavior is 
to enhance one’s ability to attract a mate (Baker & Maner, 2008). This includes risk-taking 
behaviors that are directly related to gaining sexual access to the opposite-sex (such as sexual 
risk-taking), but also behaviors that are not directly linked with mate-seeking per se (such as 
reckless driving or gambling) but that are beneficial to one’s reputation and thus enhance 
one’s access to more mates (e.g. males might try to impress potential female mating partners 
by risky driving maneuvers or taking high risk gambles; Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller & 
Fischer, 2013). In line with costly signaling theory (Zahavi, 1975), evolutionary literature 
proposed that individuals may engage in risky behaviors that are potentially costly as a way of 
signaling to others that they possess desirable characteristics (Baker & Maner, 2009). In fact, 
according to Kelly & Dumbar’ study (2001) females appear to be attracted by males’ risk-
taking. According to their results females rated men taking physical risks as more attractive 
than men avoiding risk-taking.  
Based on those theories, several studies have shown that sexual stimuli can increase the 
level of financial risk-taking (Baker & Maner, 2008; Baker & Maner, 2009; Greitemeyer, 
Kastenmüller & Fischer, 2013). However, none of these studies has shown how deeper 
motives in mating such as the preferences for more short- or long-term relationships can 
influence the levels of risk seeking. We fill this gap in two studies.  
 
Differences Between Short- and Long-Term Strategies 
 Mating alliances between men and women are universal. Almost every known society 
has formal mating alliances between males and females (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). However, 
the duration of a mating alliance can vary significantly, from a few hours till several decades. 
In general, the gender that usually exhibits more promiscuous, short-term mating tactics is 
male as men invest less in offspring (Oliver & Hyde, 1993; Schmitt, 2005). Men have 
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benefited more than women from adopting short-term mating tactics. A man mating with 50 
different women in a year would have more offspring than a woman mating with 50 different 
men in the same period. As a result, men are much more willing than women to engage in 
sexual relations (Clark & Hatfield, 1989). 
Despite the robust gender difference in preference for short-term mating tactics, there is 
a considerable within-sex variation in preference for short- or long-term mating (Schmitt, 
2005). Although men and women both vary with respect to mating tactics, the implications of 
this variation usually are different for each gender. Despite the fact that long-term mating 
tactics are more fit for females, a woman can reap benefits from short-term mating tactics 
(Wolff & MacDonald, 2004). Women who engage in short-term mating can obtain immediate 
resources or protection, ensure their reproduction if her long-term mate is infertile, and gain 
access to high-quality genes by short-term mating with a man who is not her long-term mate 
(Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Similarly, men can also benefit by pursuing more long-term tactics. 
Long-term mating may help men to increase the survival chances of their offspring in 
demanding environments, to obtain women of high mate value (for example more healthy and 
fertile women) and to solve the problem of concealed ovulation (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; 
Schmitt, 2005). Furthermore, long-term tactics might be a good fit for men that do not have 
the attributes women desire in short-term mates (for example high social status).   
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Mating Tactics and Decision Making 
As expected, mating tactics have a profound effect on decisions that are directly linked 
to mating. Individuals adopting short-term strategies have a more positive attitude towards 
casual sex and are more experienced in casual dating than people adopting more long-term 
tactics (Buss & Schmitt, 1993). Furthermore, short-term oriented individuals have been found 
to engage in unprotected sex more often than more long-term oriented individuals (Seal & 
Agostinelly, 1994). When it comes to mate choice, people adopting short-term strategies have 
been found to value physical attractiveness and sex appeal while people adopting long-term 
tactics place more weight on characteristics like good personal and parenting qualities, such 
as being kind, affectionate, responsible and loyal (Simpson & Gangestad, 1992). In line with 
these preferences, short-term oriented individuals have been found to acquire partners who are 
more socially visible and more physically/sexually attractive. Conversely, long-term oriented 
people were found to be involved with partners who are more affectionate, faithful, 
responsible and committed to the relationship (Simpson & Gangestad, 1992).  
Recent findings show that mating tactics can have an influence on decisions which are 
of more economic nature and not directly linked to reproduction. Durante & Arsena (2014) 
found that women employing short-term tactics prefer more variety when it comes to product 
choice. Specifically, women adopting short-term tactics select more unique options from 
consumer product sets than women adopting more long-term tactics. Furthermore, Sundie and 
colleagues (2011) showed that short-term mating tactics led men to consume more high status 
products as opposed to long-term tactics. Their findings show that short-term tacticians 
engage in conspicuous consumption more often than long-term strategists.  
One important variable for the emergence of mating strategies, and as a result for their 
impact on decisions, is the salience of the mating goals. In decisions directly linked to mating 
such as partner choices, mating goals are salient as the decision itself involves mating goals. 
68 
 
However, for decisions that are not directly linked to mating, these goals have to be activated 
by a cue (either external or internal). Indeed, all the differences in more economic decisions 
between short- and long-term strategists were found after mating goals were activated. In 
Durante & Arsena’s study the difference in variety seeking between short-term and long-term 
oriented women was found for participants that were in the fertile days of the menstrual cycle 
(during ovulation); when mating goals are more active. In Sundie et al.’s study the difference 
in conspicuous consumption was found after showing male participants pictures of attractive 
women.  
 
Mating Tactics and Financial Risk-Taking 
Taking highly uncertain gambles is often considered to be irrational from a classic 
economic perspective, however, choosing to gamble can sometimes be an optimal strategy 
when expected profits from safer choices are negligible (e.g., Kacelnik & Bateson, 1996). 
From an evolutionary perspective, the main function of risk-taking behavior is to enhance 
individuals’ ability to attract a mate, as risks can provide fast gains in monetary and non-
monetary terms (e.g. status and reputation; Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller & Fischer, 2013). 
However, risk taking is not always the optimal strategy to acquire a mate. Baker & Maner 
(2008) show that risk-taking is used in situations in which social dominance, confidence, or 
ambition have to be displayed. However, in situations in which other characteristics (such as 
reproduction value) lead to mate acquisition risk-taking is not used as a strategy.  
Similarly, we expect that different mating tactics will lead to different levels of 
preferences for risk-taking, as every tactic has different pathways that lead to mate 
acquisition. One of the main characteristics of short-term tactics is the involvement in a 
relatively high number of mating relationships. Searching for more than one possible mate 
leads to a high level of intersexual competition. Short-term oriented individuals have to 
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compete with other short-term oriented individuals for the acquisition of the highest number 
of mates. Baker & Maner (2009) found that higher levels of intersexual competition lead to 
higher levels of financial risk-taking. Furthermore, it has been found that people adopting 
short-term tactics value social visibility and high status (Simpson & Gangestad, 1992). As it 
was pointed out above, risk-taking is an optimal strategy when social visibility and status 
provide an edge in mate acquisition (Baker & Maner, 2008). Findings show that short-term 
oriented individuals are more sensitive towards risk-taking behaviors such as unprotected sex 
(Seal & Agostinelly, 1994). Therefore, we expect people adopting short-term strategies to 
prefer more risky options.  
On the other hand, long-term tactics are based on characteristics such as stability and 
investment in the relationship and its potential outcomes (e.g. offspring). Individuals adopting 
more long-term mating tactics value more stability and have been found to invest more in the 
quality of their offspring (Griskevicius et al., 2013). As a result it makes sense that those 
individuals will be oriented towards more stable and safe ways of acquiring resources. 
Furthermore, indications of an individual’s willingness to invest her/his resources wisely and 
within a committed partnership can be a crucial characteristics of one’s long-term 
attractiveness (Sundie et al., 2011). Griskevicius et al. (2013) found that individuals 
exhibiting higher levels of family investment preferred more safe financial options. Therefore, 
we expect that individuals adopting long-term strategies will have a preference towards less 
risky options.  
Taken all together we expect that differences in mating tactics will lead to different 
levels of financial risk taking. In line with previous studies on mating tactics and economic 
decision making we expect to find this difference only when mating goals are salient. We 
conduct two studies to test our prediction.  
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Study 1 
The goal of the first study was to test our hypothesis with well-established measures and 
manipulations of the three core variables (mating tactics, mating goal salience and financial 
risk-taking).  
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and seventy heterosexual male participants were recruited from Mechanical 
Turk (Mage=38.78, SD=11,74).  
 
Procedure 
Mating goal salience prime: Participants were instructed that they would have to rate 15 
pictures that would be used in an advertising campaign. In the ‘mating goal salience’ 
condition, 15 pictures of non-nude female models were shown. These models assumed 
different poses and wore diverse outfits, but all were dressed in a sexually appealing manner 
(e.g., swimsuit or lingerie). In the control condition, the photographs contained models who 
were displayed with relatively modest, unrevealing clothing (Van den Bergh, Dewitte, & 
Warlop, 2008). 
Risk-taking Task: To assess financial risk-taking, we invited participants to take part in 
a seemingly unrelated gambling study which included two hypothetical lottery options 
(Duclos, Wan & Jiang, 2014). Option A (relatively safe alternative) offered an 80% chance of 
winning $200 and a 20% of winning nothing (high odds/low reward) whereas option B 
(riskier alternative) offered 20% chance of winning $800 and an 80% chance of winning 
nothing (low odds/high reward). After considering this information, participants were to 
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report their relative preference between the two options on a 8-point scale (1 - I strongly 
prefer option A and 8- strongly prefer option B). 
Mating Tactics: Last, mating tactics were assessed by means of the Sociosexual 
Orientation Inventory (SOI; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). SOI consists of five self-report 
indices: (a) number of different sex partners in the past year; (b) number of different sex 
partners foreseen in the next five years; (c) number of times having engaged in sex with 
someone on one and only one occasion; (d) frequency of sexual fantasy involving partners 
other than the current one (responded to on an 8-point scale, where 1 = never and 8 = at least 
once a day); and (e) three aggregated items assessing participants’ attitudes toward engaging 
in casual, uncommitted sex (e.g., “I can imagine myself being comfortable and enjoying 
casual sex with different partners”; answered on 9-point scales, where 1 = strongly disagree 
and 9 = strongly agree). Following Simpson & Gangestad (1991), we used a set of simple 
weights to obtain a unit-weighted index, as follows: SOI = 5 × (no. of partners in the past 
year) + 1 × (no. of partners foreseen) + 5 × (no. of one-night stands) + 4 × (frequency of 
sexual fantasy) + 2 × (attitudes toward engaging in casual, uncommitted sex). Higher scores 
indicate an unrestricted sociosexual orientation and the adoption of short-term mating tactics, 
whereas lower scores indicate restricted sociosexual orientation and the adoption of long-term 
mating tactics. 
 
Results 
Using the Tobit model we regressed attitudes towards the riskier gamble against mating 
goal salience prime (dummy variable, 0=control, 1=mating goal salience) and sociosexuality 
(continuous variable). The analysis showed that there was a main effect of mating prime 
(t(169)= -2.060, p=0.041, b=-1.963) but showed no effect of sociosexuality (t(169)=0.121, 
p=0.859, b=0.180). Most importantly, it showed that the interaction between the mating prime 
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and sociosexuality was significant (t(169)=2.420, p=0.010, b=0.034) and positive. This means 
that when a mating goal was salient, higher (lower) levels of sociosexuality led to higher 
(lower) levels of risk taking. We rerun the analysis adding childhood socioeconomic 
background as a control variable (childhood SES was assessed using established measures; 
Griskevicius et al., 2011). The interaction between mating cues and SOI remained significant 
(t(169)=2.420, p=0.017, b=0.034). 
Furthermore we conducted a spotlight analysis to investigate which part of the 
population drives the results1. The spotlight analysis one SD above and below the mean of 
SOI showed that the effect was mainly driven by the restricted individuals. The mating goal 
prime made those individuals prefer the riskier option significantly less (t(169)=-1.959,  
p=0.052, b=-0.803). For the unrestricted participants, although the effect of the prime was 
positive (they chose the riskier option more) it was not significant (t(169)= 1.517, p=0.131, 
b=0.875).  
The findings of our first experiment show that different mating tactics lead to different 
levels of risk taking. They also show, surprisingly, that the effect is mainly driven by the 
sexually more restricted individuals (long-term mating tactics). According to our findings 
those individuals prefer safer options when their mating goals are active.  
                                                          
1 Although the structure of the data for the dependent variable is not linear previous studies (Duclos, Wan & 
Jiang, 2014) have used linear models (like spotlight analysis) to analyze the data of the specific variable. 
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Study 2 
In study 2 we sought to replicate the findings of the first study using a different way of 
assessing financial risk-taking. 
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and one heterosexual men were recruited from Mechanical Turk 
(Mage=39.96, SD=11.09). 
 
Procedure  
The manipulation of mating goal salience and the assessment of mating goals were the 
same as study 1.  
Risk-taking task: Participants received a risk preference questionnaire based on Holt & 
Laury (2002), involving 10 choices between pairs of two-outcome lotteries, A and B. In 
lottery A the possible outcomes were $16 and $20 (low variance–low risk). In lottery B the 
possible outcomes were $1 and $38.50 (high variance–high risk). The probability of receiving 
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the larger payoff increased systematically from pair 1 to pair 10. The expected value initially 
favored lottery A (pair 1-4) but reversed at decision 5, favoring lottery B (see Table 14). With 
the exception of participants who strongly favor risk-taking and as a result would select 
lottery B throughout the 10 pairs, the choice profile of a coherent decision maker would begin 
by choosing lottery A and would shift at some point to lottery B. A risk neutral participant 
would switch from A to B at decision 5. Higher switching points indicate greater risk 
aversion. A risk taking score was derived from the number of the choice at which they first 
chose Lottery B. As in previous studies using this measure, participants that deviated from a 
coherent choice pattern were excluded. We interpreted a response pattern in which, for 
example, a participant chose the high-risk lottery when it had a 5/10 chance of winning and 
then rejected it when it had a 7/10 chance of winning as indicating either misunderstanding of 
the task or inattentive responding. A total of 19 (approximately 16% of the sample) 
participants were excluded on this basis.  
 
Table 2: Risk-Taking Task 
 Lottery 1  Lottery 2 
Decision Probability of 
winning 20$ 
Probability of 
winning 16$ 
 Probability of 
winning 38.5$ 
Probability of 
winning 1$ 
1 10% 90%  10% 90% 
2 20% 80%  20% 80% 
3 30% 70%  30% 70% 
4 40% 60%  40% 60% 
5 50% 50%  50% 50% 
6 60% 40%  60% 40% 
7 70% 30%  70% 30% 
8 80% 20%  80% 20% 
9 90% 10%  90% 10% 
10 100% 0%  100% 0% 
 
Results 
The regression predicting the number of times participants chose the riskier option from 
mating goal salience prime and sociosexuality showed that there was not a main effect of 
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mating prime (t(101)= -0.5730 , p=0. 568, b=-0.261) or sociosexuality (t(101)= 0.538 
p=0.591, b=0.021). As predicted however, the interaction between the mating prime and 
sociosexuality was (marginally) significant (t(101)= 1.971, p=0.051, b=0.015) and positive. 
Once again the results show that when mating goal was salient, higher (lower) levels of 
sociosexuality led to higher (lower) levels of risk taking. A spotlight analysis showed again 
that the effect was again mainly driven by the restricted individuals. The mating prime made 
restricted individuals prefer the riskier option a marginally significantly smaller number of 
times (t(101)= -1.768, p=0.080, b=-1.055). In contrast, the prime had a positive effect for the 
unrestricted, but the effect was not significant (t(101)= 0.8633, p=0.391, b=0.534).  
The findings replicate the results of the first study. Once again we find that different 
mating tactics lead to different levels of risk taking when mating goals are salient. Once again 
the effect is mostly driven by the sexually restricted individuals who prefer to choose less 
risky options.  
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General Discussion 
Financial risk-taking is a behavior with important implications for people’s welfare. 
Hundreds of studies have tried to investigate and interpret why people take financially risky 
decisions, which in some occasions are considered highly irrational. The results of our two 
studies show that financial risk-taking might be connected with some more fundamental 
decisions on people’s lives such as reproduction and resource allocation. Our results imply 
that individual differences on the attitudes towards the investment on a romantic relationship 
can have an impact on the levels of financial risk-taking. Our findings show that the level of 
financial risk-taking depends on individuals’ preferences for short-term or long-term romantic 
relationships when mating goals are salient.  
Our results suggest that financial risk-taking is linked with more strategic decisions such 
as the time and effort each individual is willing to invest in a romantic relationship. Our 
findings are consistent with a nuanced understanding of how human mating tactics reflect 
general principles of parental investment and resource allocation. Humans can and do follow 
different sexual strategies. Some individuals follow a low-parental investment strategy by 
investing in the pursuit of multiple short-term sexual partners. Other humans follow a high-
parental investment mating strategy by investing more effort, time, and money in a primary 
mate and any offspring resulting from that partnership. These differences in turn have an 
impact on peoples’ preferences on ways of gaining resources. 
Our findings are in line with the idea that people who invest more resources in a 
romantic relationship prefer more safe, steady ways of obtaining resources. Previous findings 
suggest that there are several possible reasons behind this risk averse behavior. One possible 
reason is that these individuals search for safe ways to secure the resources for the extra 
investment they have to make in order to ensure the success of their chosen tactic 
(Griskevicius et al., 2013). Another possible reason is that they use this low risk behavior as a 
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signal to potential mates. People adopting long-term mating tactics have been found to value 
stability and responsibility as main characteristics in mates (Simpson & Gangestad, 1992). 
Therefore risky behavior might not be the optimal signal strategy for long-term strategists to 
attract other long-term mates. Future research can try to further clarify the reasons 
underpinning the risk averse behavior of people adopting long-term mating tactics.  
Our findings show that mating cues made restricted sociosexuals (long-term tacticians) 
take less risks. However, mating cues did not have an impact on the unrestricted ones (short-
term tacticians). Although for those individuals mating cues created a trend towards more 
risk-taking, it was not statistically significant. This is quite surprising as several studies have 
shown that mating cues made men, who are the more sociosexual gender, more risk seeking 
(Baker & Maner, 2008; Baker & Maner, 2009; Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller & Fischer, 2013). 
A possible explanation is that the environment in our experiments was not competitive 
enough for the unrestricted individuals to become risk seeking. According to Baker & Maner 
(2009), men become more risk-seeking in the presence of mating cues in order to outrun the 
competition. Therefore, it is possible that unrestricted individuals will become more risk-
seeking in the presence of competition. Future research can test this hypothesis by 
manipulating the presence of competition, for example in private vs public gambling 
situations.  
The majority of theories on mating tactics suggest that the adoption of these mating 
strategies depends on environmental factors, and more specifically on resource availability 
during childhood (Belsky et al., 1991; Chisholm, 1993; 1996; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). 
Recent studies show that the exposure to certain environments during childhood sensitize 
individuals to use specific strategies on reproduction and parental investment all their life (e.g 
Griskevicius et al., 2013). As a result one could expect that mating tactics is a steady 
personality trait. However, some studies show that mating tactics can be manipulated (Sundie 
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et al., 2011; Chen, Zheng & Yan Zhang, 2015). For example in Chen, Zeng and Yan Zhang 
the authors manipulated short term orientation by asking participants to read a story about a 
date with a very attractive member of the opposite sex who would never meet again in their 
lives. The long term condition was about a date that would end up in a long-term relationship. 
In our studies we measured the tendency to adopt specific mating strategies in a way that is in 
line with the assumption that mating tactic is a trait variable. Future research could try to 
replicate our results by manipulating the type of mating tactic. This could be a very useful 
behavior modification tool in the case that risk-taking behavior leads to loss of welfare.  
Our studies used a sexual arousal prime (showing pictures of the opposite gender 
dressed in a sexually appealing way) to make mating goals salient. The effect of sexual 
arousal on risk-taking has been studied extensively in the past (Baker & Maner, 2008; Baker 
& Maner, 2009; Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller & Fischer, 2013; Festjens, Bruyneel & Dewitte, 
2014). According to the findings, sexual arousal leads to more risk-taking behavior. However, 
a recent replication effort brought into question the strength of the effect, suggesting the 
existence of publication bias (Shanks et al., 2015). Our findings provide some insights to this 
debate by suggesting that mating tactics can be a potential moderator variable that drives of 
the effect of sexual arousal on risk-taking behavior in different directions. We suggest that 
more research should be done in this direction before drawing firm conclusions about the 
extent of the effect.  
Our studies used only male participants as men have been appointed to be the more 
sensitive gender when it comes to sexual stimuli and risk-taking behavior (Baker & Maner, 
2008; Baker & Maner, 2009; Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller & Fischer, 2013). Women have been 
found to be more risk-averse than men, and it has also been suggested that mating motives do 
not have an effect on their levels of risk-taking (Baker & Maner, 2008). However, recent 
findings show that women can be more risk-taking if they are primed with appropriate sexual 
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cues (Festjens, Bruyneel & Dewitte, 2014). Future research can try to replicate our findings in 
women in order to clarify whether the effect of mating tactics on risk we find in men is an 
intra-gender strategy to gain resources or just a way of men to display their mating 
characteristics to the opposite gender.  
Our studies investigated risk-taking behavior in the gain domain. That is, participants 
had to choose between gambling tasks that provided them with high/low chances of winning a 
certain amount of money or winning nothing. Future studies can try to extend our findings in 
the loss domain, where participants could lose an initial endowment should they lose in the 
game.   
Future endeavors can test the effect of mating tactics on other domains of risk-taking 
behavior (e.g. risky driving behavior) in order to investigate the generalizability of our results 
in risk-taking behaviors that are not directly linked with financial resources. The tendency for 
more risk-taking we find in unrestricted sociosexuals might become significant for behaviors 
more directly linked to immediate reproduction. In risk seeking behaviors more directly 
linked to reproduction. Furthermore, future research efforts can test the impact of mating 
tactics on other economic behaviors such as discounting and saving. Providing insights on 
whether the effect of mating tactics on financial risk-taking can be generalized to other 
behaviors is important in order to understand the extent of the influence of mating tactics on 
human behavior.  
Why do individuals engage in risk-taking behavior? Taking a more evolutionary 
perspective, our studies show that risk-taking behavior can be adaptive. It can be influenced 
by the way people decide to allocate their resources. Specifically, risk-taking can be 
influenced by the way individuals decide to reproduce. In particular, we find that people 
willing to invest more time and resources in a romantic relationship engage in less risk-
seeking behaviors when mating goals are salient. Our findings contribute to a growing body 
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of literature arguing that economic behaviors are highly influenced by more fundamental 
motives in the lives of humans.  
  
81 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The goal of the present dissertation was to assess the impact of three dual systems, each 
of which has the distinction between the present and the future as an important theoretical 
cornerstone, on three important aspects of people’s economic behavior: rational choice, 
conformity and financial risk-taking. We showed that the impact of those systems is not so 
straightforward. The findings of the three essays suggest that more research is needed to 
conclude whether some aspects of the dichotomies studied can have a negative or positive 
impact on behavior.  
 
Essay 1 
In the first essay we show that the degree of budget waste resulting from intuitive and 
cognitive judgments is comparable, but that overall budget waste across the two types of 
judgments is significantly higher. We conclude that both types of judgments are equally 
appropriate to make consistent economic decisions. However, a further analysis reveals that 
the discrepancy between choices made under the influence of intuitive judgments on the one 
hand and cognitive judgments on the other had a negative impact on overall budget waste.  
Our findings provide an answer to the question as to which type of judgment leads to 
more severe choice inconsistencies. We show that when measuring the severity of 
inconsistent choices on budget waste, there is no difference in rational choice between the two 
types of judgment. We also speculate that this null effect might be driven by the inclusion of 
some additional conditions in our experimental setting (a non-binary choice paradigm and the 
use of budget constraints and price variation) in comparison with previous studies. Last, we 
contribute to the literature on affective forecasting errors by showing that the actual 
dissimilarity in preferences resulting from the two types of judgment can lead to severe 
inconsistencies which end up in a significant waste of budget from an overall perspective.  
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Essay 2 
In the second essay, we show that the impact of resource scarcity cues on the extent to 
which people conform to social suggestions depends on childhood background. Resource 
scarcity cues make people who grew up poor to become more conformists, while they do not 
have an impact on the tendency to conform for people who grew up rich. Our results suggest 
that the effect of resource scarcity cues on conformity is the result of an adaptive process. Our 
findings are consistent with the notion that social learning can be more useful whenever 
acquiring information through individual learning is difficult (when being raised in poor 
conditions), whereas individual learning can be more useful in environments where the cost of 
exploration and experimentation for acquiring information is not so high (when being raised 
in rich conditions).  
We contribute to the literature by showing that the extent to which people get influenced 
by social norms is moderated by individual differences in the circumstances in which people 
grew up. We also connect a specific set of life history strategies with conformity. Specifically, 
we show that fast strategies, traditionally shown to be adopted by people growing up in poor 
environments, are associated with more compliance with social information.  
 
Essay 3 
In the third essay, we show that the extent to which people take risks in financial 
decisions can be influenced by the type of mating tactics they adopt. We find that when 
mating goals are salient, people adopting long-term tactics become less risk-taking. There is 
no significant effect of mating goal salience on financial risk-taking for people adopting short-
term mating tactics. Our results suggest that financial risk-taking is linked to more strategic 
decisions such as the time and effort an individual is willing to invest in a romantic 
relationship. Our findings are consistent with a nuanced understanding of how humans choose 
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to acquire resources through either higher or lower risk strategies. Humans can and do follow 
different sexual strategies. Some individuals follow a low investment strategy by pursuing 
short-term sexual partners. Other individuals follow a high investment mating strategy by 
spending more effort, time, and money on a primary mate. Our results show that these 
differences in turn have an impact on peoples’ preferences for how they choose to gain 
resources.  
 
Future Research 
Exploration into the Links between the Different Duals Systems 
An important question future research should address is to what extent the three systems 
we investigated in the present dissertation are similar as constructs. Taking a more careful 
look at the literature on these three systems reveals similarities in the behavioral outcome of 
certain poles of these dichotomies. For example, intuitive judgments, fast strategies and short-
term mating tactics, apart from their common focus on immediate benefits, were also found to 
lead to more risk-taking (e.g. Ditto et al., 2006; Griskevicius et al., 2013; Seal & Agostinelly, 
1994) and variety seeking (e.g. Geyskens et al., 2007; White et al., 2014; Durante & Arsena, 
2014). On the other hand, cognition, slow strategies and long-term mating tactics have been 
found to be focused on more long-term benefits and lead to less risk-taking and variety 
seeking.  
Additionally, similar aspects of the three dichotomies seem to be triggered by similar 
cues. For example situational resource scarcity cues has been found to lead to more intuitive 
judgments (Shah et al., 2012), fast strategies (Griskevicius et al., 2011) and short-term mating 
strategies (Belsky et al., 1991 although this is debatable). On the other hand, cognitive 
judgments, slow strategies and long-term tactics were found to be associated with more 
resource abundance. Some important questions arise. How different are these three dual 
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paradigms? How strong are the correlations between them? Future endeavors should try to 
address these important questions. In the next two sections we will provide information on 
some black spots in the literature which future research can investigate in order to gain more 
insights in the connections between these three dual-systems.  
 
Life history strategies and Mating tactics 
The link between life history strategies and mating tactics is an important topic that 
needs further clarification as findings seem to be mixed. Mating tactics seem to be a core 
element of life history theory. According to life history theory, early childhood experiences 
adaptively channel people to one of two mating tactics. Individuals who are exposed to high 
levels of stress coming from, for example, inconsistent parenting, economic hardship and 
harsh physical environments during their childhood tend to develop insecure attachment 
styles. These individuals get physically and sexually mature earlier than people who were not 
exposed to high levels of stress during their childhood. Attachment insecurity and early 
physical maturity subsequently lead to the evolutionary adaptive development of what is 
called an "opportunistic" reproductive strategy in adulthood (i.e., short-term tactics), as it will 
lead to higher levels of fitness in high-stress environments (Belsky et al., 1991). Conversely, 
individuals exposed to lower levels of stress during their childhood tend to develop a more 
"investing" reproductive strategy in adulthood (i.e., long-term tactics) that it is more fit for 
low-stress environments (Belsky et al., 1991). 
Griskevicius et al. (2011) found that fast strategists tend to reproduce earlier in their 
lifetime than slow strategists. Early reproduction is found to be characteristic of people 
adopting short-term mating tactics (Gangestad & Simpson, 1990). Furthermore, according to 
the results of essay 3, long-term tactics lead to less risk-taking - a behavior consistent with a 
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slower life-history strategy. As a result, one can conclude that fast strategies are linked with 
short-term mating tactics while slow strategies are associated with long-term mating tactics.  
In direct contrast to life history theory however, Gangestad & Simpson (2000) have 
proposed strategic pluralism theory. According to the theory, when local environments are 
harsh and the difficulties of rearing offspring are high, the adaptive need for bi-parental 
investment increases. Because both genders (i.e., father and mother) are needed to ensure the 
survival and the development of offspring in more demanding environments, the importance 
of family investment and fidelity increases. Therefore, Gangestad & Simpson predict that 
individuals living in harsh environments will adopt more long-term oriented mating tactics. In 
less harsh environments where bi-parental care is less necessary for rearing offspring, 
strategic pluralism theory predicts that monogamy would be less prevalent. In cultures with 
lower stress levels and abundant resources, human psychological adaptations should direct 
people to more short-term mating tactics. The reason behind this psychological adaptation is 
that in ancestral environments when bi-parental care was not as crucial, men could afford to 
channel more of their reproductive effort into short-term mating tactics in order to reap the 
benefits of such a strategy (i.e., a higher number of offspring). Women also could benefit 
from short-term mating tactics in such circumstances, as these provided access to high-quality 
genes, given a reduced dependence on a long-term male's resources (Gangestad, 2001).  
In a cross-cultural study, Schmitt (2005) provided evidence supporting strategic 
pluralism theory. According to the findings of the study, individuals in societies characterized 
by environmental harshness (which according to life-history theory lead to fast strategies) 
tend to adopt more long-term mating tactics as expressed by SOI (Sociosexual Orientation 
Inventory) which focuses on the number sexual partners and the attitude towards 
uncommitted sex. However, Schmitt’s study did not investigated some other aspects of 
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mating tactics theory such as the energy invested into a romantic relationship and the number 
of offspring.   
Further research is needed to clarify what the precise link is between those two 
concepts, life history strategies and mating tactics. For example, it might be the case that fast 
strategists employ some features of short-tacticians (such as investing in a high number of 
offspring which entails low investment on each offspring) but not some others (such as 
relying on a high number of mates). 
 
Resource Scarcity and Dual-processing System 
Another issue that needs to be clarified is the link between resource scarcity and the 
dual-processing system. Resource scarcity has been found to harm cognitive function. Mani et 
al. (2013) found that inducing economic concerns in poor people made them underperform in 
cognitive control tasks. Some types of resource scarcity such as hunger and time pressure 
have been used in the literature as manipulations of intuition. Furthermore, resource scarcity 
has been associated with more impulsive behaviors such as overbuying, saving less and more 
caloric intake, behaviors that are typically attributed to intuition (Shurtleff, 2009; Briers & 
Laporte, 2013; Xu, Schwarz & Wyer, 2015). Therefore, one can conclude that resource 
scarcity cues lead to more intuitive decision making.  
However, literature so far has focused only on situational and temporary forms of 
resource scarcity and has ignored more chronic and severe forms of scarcity which could have 
more strong and permanent effects on behavior. Therefore, some important questions arise. 
What is the chronic impact of resource scarcity on people with regard to the use of intuition? 
Does childhood poverty have an effect on the extent to which individuals rely on their 
intuition in decision making? Answering those questions will provide insights into what is the 
exact relationship between life history strategies and the dual-processing system. For 
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example, showing that childhood poverty makes individuals rely on their intuition more (in 
their later life) will provide insights in the extent to which fast (slow) strategies can be 
considered similar to chronic intuitive (cognitive) decision making.  
Furthermore, providing more insights in this issue will help researchers and policy-
makers to design appropriate interventions in order to alleviate the potential negative 
influence of resource scarcity on people’s behavior. It will also provide useful insights for 
certain streams of literature. For example, finding that chronic experiences of resource 
scarcity can make people more sensitive to intuitive reactions can help poverty research. 
Overreliance to the intuitive decision system might be a potential source of some commonly 
observed but not clearly explained problems poor people face, such as lack of self-control.  
 
Interaction Effects between the Three Systems 
In the previous part we provided some suggestions for future research concerning the 
interrelations between the three dual systems. However, literature has treated those three 
systems as different constructs. Taking this perspective, some very interesting topics for 
future research concerning potential interaction effects between the systems arise.  
One promising topic could be an investigation into the potential interaction between 
intuition and life history strategies. According to life history theory, early life environments 
stir people to adopt a specific set of strategies. For example, harsh early life environments 
lead people to adopt fast strategies (e.g. Belsky et al., 1991). According to recent findings, 
people use these strategies adopted in their childhood only when they feel threatened. 
Griskevicius et al. (2011) showed that people growing up in harsh (less harsh) environments 
used fast (slow) strategies when they were primed with mortality cues. It seems that the 
recruitment of life history strategies is an automatic rather than a deliberate response, as 
people tend to rely on them in stressful situations, which have been found to trigger less 
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cognitive and more intuitive reactions (Gillath et al., 2011; Mani et al., 2013). Future research 
could investigate whether intuitive judgment mode would elicit the use of life history 
strategies. For instance would people who grew up in poor (rich) environments use fast (slow) 
strategies when they are hungry or under cognitive load (and thus use their intuition more)? 
Answering this question could provide more insights into how widespread the use of life 
history strategies is, and whether we can prevent people from using them in circumstances 
that lead to disadvantageous decisions making.  
Another potentially interesting interaction could be the one between life history 
strategies and romantic motives. One of the core elements in the life history strategies 
continuum is the trade-off people face with regards to reproduction. Given the fact that 
reproduction is an important element of life history strategies, an important question arises. 
Could mating motives be another potential trigger of the use of life history strategies? Would 
people who grew up in a poor environment use fast strategies when they are primed with 
sexual cues? Answering this question would provide insights in how general the use of life 
history strategies is in people’s life, and whether it extends beyond threatening situations.  
In essay 3 we show that mating tactics have an impact on decision making when mating 
motives are salient. In both of the studies we use sexual arousal to manipulate mating motives 
salience. However, sexual arousal, like other visceral states (e.g hunger, thirst etc.), has been 
found to trigger more intuitive judgments. Therefore, future endeavors could provide more 
insights in the interaction between mating tactics and intuitive judgments. Future studies 
could test whether intuition (primed by cues irrelevant to mating such as cognitive load or 
hunger) is a general trigger of the impact of mating tactics on people’s decisions.  
Furthermore, all theories trying to explain why people adopt different mating strategies 
base their explanation on environmental conditions and more specifically on (chronic) 
resource availability. Apparently, as mentioned above, there is a link between resource 
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scarcity and the adoption of different mating strategies (Schmitt, 2005). Future studies could 
provide more insights in this matter. For example, since the adoption of different mating 
tactics depends on chronic resource scarcity (similar to life history strategies) imminent 
resource scarcity could potentially serve as a trigger for the impact of mating tactics on 
individuals’ decision making. Future endeavors could try to replicate the findings of our third 
essay by using resource scarcity cues instead of mating salience cues to manipulate the use of 
mating tactics.  
 
Dual System Implications for Conformity and Preference Consistency 
The impact of all three dual systems on financial risk-taking (one of the three dependent 
variables we focused on this dissertation) is known as it has been researched. Ditto et al. 
(2006) showed that intuition leads to more risk-taking than cognition, Griskevicius et al. 
(2011) showed that fast strategies lead to more risk-taking than slow strategies and lastly, the 
results of our third essay indicate that long-term mating tactics might lead to less risky 
decision. However, the impact of the three dual systems on the other two dependent variables 
of the dissertation (conformity and preference consistency) is not so clear and needs further 
investigation.  
In the second paper, we showed that life history strategies influence one’s tendency to 
conform. A further investigation into the impact of the other two dual systems studied in this 
dissertation on conformity might provide novel insights in factors that affect compliance with 
social influence. In the second paper we argued  that people have two main ways to acquire 
information: individual and social learning (with conformity as a form of social learning). 
Independent research has shown that using more independent forms of learning requires more 
slow and deliberative processing (Wheeler, Briño & Hermann, 2007). As a result, one could 
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expect that intuitive judgments will lead to more social learning, and hence conformity. 
Future studies could investigate whether intuition leads to more conformism.  
Furthermore, literature provides some hints that mating tactics might have an effect on 
people’s tendencies to conform. Griskevicius et al. (2006) showed that mating primes make 
men (the more socio-sexually unrestricted gender) conform less, while it had the opposite 
effect on women (the less socio-sexually unrestricted gender). Probst (1999) found that people 
adopting short-term strategies scored lower on agreeableness than people adopting long-term 
strategies. Moreover, short-term oriented individuals have been found to acquire partners who 
are more socially visible, therefore, non-conformity might be an optimal strategy for short-
term oriented individuals to attract mates as it will allow them to stand out of the crowd 
(Probst, 1999). On the other hand, social agreeableness is a characteristic that long-term 
oriented people  seek in their partners, thus, conformity seems to be a good strategy for them 
to attract mates. Future research can try to provide more insights in this issue.  
With regard to preference consistency, the link between the other two dual systems (life 
history strategies and mating tactics) and consistent decision making is not so clear. Literature 
has shown that fast life history strategies and short-term mating tactics can lead to more 
variety seeking than slow life history strategies and long-term mating tactics when it comes to 
product choices (White et al., 2013; Durante et al., 2014). This more diversified choice 
behavior can potentially lead to inconsistent choice and loss of budget. Although the 
connection between fast history strategies, short-term mating tactics and choice inconsistency 
seems weak, investigating this link further can be an interesting and important future research 
proposition for several reasons. First, it can provide more evolutionary and thus ultimate 
explanations of the reasons why individuals make inconsistent decisions. Second, it can 
potentially provide insights on the circumstances in which choice inconsistency could be 
adaptive and thus beneficial.   
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Beyond Current Findings 
An important characteristic of the dual-processing system is that the distinction between 
intuition and cognition is not definite. According to the literature, intuition and cognition do 
not act in isolation from each other: both are almost always simultaneously active. In some 
cases intuition puts more weight on the decisions, while in some other instances cognition is 
mainly responsible for the decisions (Dhar & Gorlin, 2012). However, the majority of the 
manipulations in the existing literature have treated the distinction as definitive. Almost all 
published studies have a condition where cognition is prevalent and another condition where 
intuition prevails. There is no study that tried to investigate how different levels of cognition 
or intuition can influence behavior. For instance, moderate levels of hunger (and thus 
prevalence of intuition) could have a different impact on individuals’ behavior than high 
levels of hunger. This would have some interesting implications for the results of the first 
essay. Different levels of intuition (or cognition) could create different indifference levels 
between products and this could potentially result in  a higher overall budget waste. 
The same rationale can be applied for both life history strategies and mating tactics. For 
both of those concepts the distinction between the two poles is not definite but rather a 
continuum on which some people tend to score more extreme than others. So for example 
some fast strategists could adopt faster life-history strategies than others. The same reasoning 
could be applied to mating tactics. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate how 
different adoption levels within the one (or the other) side of the continuums can influence 
people’s behavior. For example future endeavors could investigate whether people who grew 
up in conditions of extreme poverty adopt faster strategies than people grew up in moderate 
poverty, and whether this has significantly different behavioral outcomes.  
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Conclusion 
What is the effect of different time orientations on people’s economic decision making? 
Does focusing on the present lead to more disadvantageous decisions than focusing on the 
future? In the present dissertation we used three different dual systems, all of which rely on 
this difference between present and future orientation, to provide some answers to those 
questions. The results of our three essays propose that the effect of different time orientation 
is more complex and adaptive than the common understanding that present-focus is bad and 
future focus is invariably good. Present and future orientation can be equally good or bad for 
people’s economic decision making. This impact depends highly on the context of each 
decision, in combination with several important individual differences. More research is 
needed to further improve our insights in the environmental factors (current or past) that 
determine which of the two decisional frames provide the most optimal results.   
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Appendix A  
 
ESSAY 2: Regression Results 
Study 1 
 
Table 3: Childhood Socio-economic Status Regression Results 
 T p b SE 
Constant 73.133 0.000 6.933 0.095 
SES -0.124 0.901 -0.007 0.059 
Scarcity  0.816 0.415 0.155 0.190 
Interaction -2.972 0.003 -0.355 0.119 
 
Table 4: Current Socio-economic Status Regression Results 
 T p b SE 
Constant 73.082 0.000 6.947 0.095 
SES 0.610       0.541 0.034 0.059 
Scarcity  0.760 0.447 0.144 0.190 
Interaction -1.412 0.158 -0.158 0.112 
 
 
Study 2 
 
Table 5: Childhood Socio-economic Status Regression Results for Positive Rates 
 t p b SE 
Constant 61.694 0.000 6.925 0.112 
SES -0.971 0.332 -0.059 0.061 
Scarcity  -1.117 0.264 -0.251 0.225 
Interaction -3.866 0.000 -0.469 0.121 
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Table 6: Current Socio-economic Status Regression Results for Positive Rates 
 t p b SE 
Constant 60.636 0.000 6.927 0.114 
SES -1.368       0.172 -0.076 0.056 
Scarcity  -1.029 0.304 -0.235 0.228 
Interaction -0.568 0.568 -0.064 0.113 
 
Table 7: Childhood Socio-economic Status Regression Results for Negative Rates 
 t p b SE 
Constant 51.746 0.000 5.945 0.115 
SES 0.957 0.338 0.063 0.066 
Scarcity  -0.634 0.526 -0.146 0.221 
Interaction 2.091 0.037 0.276 0.132 
              
 
Table 8: Current Socio-economic Status Regression Results for Negative Rates 
 t p b SE 
Constant 51.726 0.000 5.963 0.115 
SES -0.889       0.374 -0.050 0.056 
Scarcity  -0,619 0.536 -0.144 0.232 
Interaction 0.712 0.477 -0.081 0.114 
 
Study 3 
 
 
 
  
Table 9: Regression Results for income scales  
 t p b SE 
Constant 874,419 0.000 4.449 0.005 
SES -0,176 0.789 -0.001 0.002 
Scarcity  4,113 0.000 0.008 0.002 
Interaction -4.527 0.000 -0.004 0.001 
Table 10: Regression Results for income scales and control variables  
 t p b SE 
Constant 181.212 0.000 4.545 0.025 
SES 0.963 0.335 0.002 0.002 
Scarcity  3.788 0.002 0.008 0.008 
Gender 4.223 0.000 0.041 0.009 
Age -5.248 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
Education -7.411 0.000 -0.016 0.002 
Interaction -4.874 0.000 -0.004 0.001 
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ESSAY 3: Regression Results 
 
Study 1 
 
 
 
Study 2 
 
Table 10: Regression Results for Tobit model 
 t p b SE 
Constant 0.17 0.868 0.189 1.137 
Sex Cues -2.30 0.023 -2.197 0.954 
SOI  0.23 0.818 0.158 0.685 
Interaction 2.60 0.017 0.037 0.037 
Table 11: Regression Results  
 t p b SE 
Constant 14.962 0.000 3.336 0.223 
Sex Cues -0.573 0.568 -0.261 0.004 
SOI  0.538 0.591 0.002 0.455 
Interaction 1.971 0.051 0.015 0.007 
